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p o l i c y ,  nthe geograph ic p o s it io n  o f  a n a t io n , in d eed , i s  the p r in ­
c ip a l  fa c t o r  co n d it io n in g  i t s  fo r e ig n  p o l i c y — the p r in c ip a l reason 
why i t  must have a fo re ig n  p o l ic y  a t a l l * * 1 I t  i s  con st tuted by 
the t e r r i t o r y  o f  a s ta te  viewed from the stan dp oin t o f  p o s it io n  
o r  lo c a t io n  in  the world* In our study o f  Russian fo r e ig n  p o l ic y  
in  i t s  d r iv e  fo r  a cce s s  to  the open se a , we need be concerned a t  
len g th  w ith  the geograph ic fa c t o r  on ly* the geograph ic s e t t in g  
o f  any n a tio n a l power in v o lv e s  sev era l b a s ic  fa c to r s *
lau
The s iz e  o f  an area that irakes up a s ta te  a f f e c t s  both  i t s  
developm ent and the in flu e n ce  I t  can w ie ld  in  in te rn a tio n a l 
a f fa ir s *  t h i l e  a r e la t iv e ly  la rg e  area Is  n ot in  I t s e l f  in d ic a ­
t iv e  o f  power, i t  i s  g e n e ra lly  a p r e r e q u is ite  fo r  a s ta te  th at 
a sp ire s  to  power* Uruguay w ith i t s  s r a l l  s iz e  can never hope to  
be p ow erfu l, y e t  B r a z il ,  though la r g e r  than the United S ta te s , 
holds a secondary p o s it io n  due to  a com bination o f  unfavor­
a b le  con d it ion s*  Shape has a bearin g  on the p o l i t i c a l  and econom­
i c  l i f e  o f  a n a t io n , f o r  n a t io n a l u n ity  i s  fo s te r e d  by compact­
n e s s , as w e ll as by the u t i l i s a t i o n  o f  resou rces  both  human and 
m ateria l*  The fo re ig n  p o l i c i e s  o f  C h ile , I t a l y ,  and Hormy are 
con d it io n ed  by th e ir  e x c e p t io n a lly  lo n g , exposed c o a s t l in e s  and 
that o f  C zechoslovakia  Is  a f fe c t e d  by i t s  lon g  h e m e d -in  land 
boundary* The lo c a t io n  o f  a s ta te  w ith  re fe re n ce  to  i t s  a cce s s ­
i b i l i t y  to  trade rou tes and p r in c ip a l reserv es  o f  in d u s tr ia l raw 
m ateria ls  a f f e c t s  i t s  economic and p o l i t i c a l  l i f e *  H istory  shows
1* Ju les Canbon, * fh e  Permanent Bases o f  French F oreign  P o licy "  
F oreign  A f f a i r s . V III (1 9 3 0 ), 173.
th at s itu a t io n s  advantageous f o r  trade and cor^nerce lea d  to  h igh  
s ta te s  o f  developm ent• Though the Netherlands and Dencark are 
s m l l  and d e f i c i e n t  In  r ln e r a l  resou rces  they are h ig h ly  developed 
because o f  th e ir  p rox im ity  to  In d u s tr ia l areas o f  Europe and the 
p r in c ip a l trade rou tes  o f  the world* 
t o r i
No lan dlock ed  n ation  in  the w orld o f  today i s  a g rea t power* 
Any n ation  th at has an in te rn a l com bination o f  geograph ic a sse ts  
th at g iv e  prom ise to  a high degree o f  development m ist g iv e  up 
i t s  a s p ira t io n s  f o r  power u n less i t  in c lu d es  among i t s  a sse ts  
d i r e c t  a c c e s s ib i l i t y  to  the sea* Some even h old  that a lan d lock ed  
n a tion  eaist push to  the sea o r  s u f fe r  p o l i t i c a l  death* Sw itzerland 
has m aintained a v ig orou s  n a tion a l l i f e  f o r  ce n tu r ie s  but i t  might 
be sa id  to  be the ex cep tion  th a t proves the ru le*  B oundaries, 
land o r  se a , can be avenues to  the ou ts id e  w orld as i s  the ca se  o f  
th ose  in  the United S ta te s , o r  p r o te c t iv e  b a r r ie r s  from i t  as i s  
true o f  B o liv ia *  A fghanistan In  her moxintain fa s tn esses  has been 
p ro tected  fro®  in va s ion  by her two pow erful neighbors but the 
i s o la t io n  r e s u lt in g  from th is  very  p r o te c t io n  has denied i t  the 
a b i l i t y  and in i t i a t i v e  fundamental to  progress*
£ U m M *
Clim ate i s  im portant, t o o ,  f o r  on ly  in  the temperate zones 
has human energy a tta in e d  the h igh  degree o f  e f f i c i e n c y  n ecessary  
to  la rg e  s c a le  in d u s t r ia l is a t io n  and expansion* Extreme dryness 
and co ld  p reclu des a g r ic u ltu r a l c r  p a sto ra l p rod u ction  in  s u f f i ­
c ie n t  q u a n tit ie s  to  be c f  any su b sta n tia l value* Extreme and 
continuous h eat or hu& idity is  no worm con ducive to  a h igh  stage 
o f  developm ent than i s  the co ld *  Research shows th a t g re a te s t
•If—
developm ent takes p la ce  In th ose  co u n tr ie s  of the m iddle la t itu d e s  
where frequ en t changes in  weather are the rule; human beings re& ct 
in  a manner fa v o ra b le  to  progress where the weather changes are  
ch a ra cte r ize d  by d i f fe r e n c e s  in  tem perature ra th er than in  m ois­
ture o r  amount o f  exposure to  su nsh ine. A l l  Great Powers today 
l i e  in  m iddle la t itu d e s *
aaU L&M , M-Xn$£6l.£gl&$ms£2L*
th e  b a s ic  n a tu ra l resou rces  of a s ta te  c o n s is t  o f  s o i l  and 
m ineral d e p o s its*  P ossess ion  of c o a l and ir o n ,  the b a s ic  m ateria ls 
o f  in d u s tr ia l  power, makes p o s s ib le  a high degree cf I n d u s tr ia l­
is a t io n  and on ly  those n a tion s that p ossess these can have coia- 
s e r c ia l  power in  peace and stren gth  In war. W ithout the* no 
rodern  n a tion  can hold the rank of Great Power. However, the 
e x ten t o f  in d u s tr ia l  developm ent by the fortu n e te  p ossessors  o f  
these resou rces  IS con d ition ed  by the degree of a c c e s s ib i l i t y  to  
the r e s e r v e s , by c liis a te  and by resou rce fu ln ess  of the people*
China is on ly  p o t e n t ia l ly  a Great Power* Her m ineral resou rces  
are y e t  undeveloped. U n til she becomes aware of her wealth and 
develops i t ,  she w i l l  r e ra in  in  that rank*
S o i l  i s ,  o f  c o u rs e , the most va lu ab le  o f  natu ra l resou rces  
f o r  i t  p rov id es  the b a s is  f o r  a l l  v eg e ta b le  and animal products 
upon which mankind su b s is ts*  Though p osse ss ion  o f  f e r t i l e  s o i l  
i s  no guarantee th* t  i t s  p ossessor  can become a Great Power, no 
area w ithout i t  ever reached th is  h igh  rank* Uruguay i s  the 
c l a s s i c  example of a cou ntry  th a t has deep , f e r t i l e  s o i l  and no 
a p p re c ia b le  amounts o f  m ineral resou rces*
In e a r l i e r  days when c i v i l i s a t i o n s  were based la r g e ly  on 
s o i l  f e r t i l i t y ,  and animal and hue an power, the absence o f  m ineral
resou rces  ir<eant fa r  le s s  to  a n a tion  than the la ck  o f  f e r t i l e  s o i l ,  
but today m ineral resou rces  are a v i t a l  p a rt o f  the a ctu a l or 
p o te n t ia l  power o f  a g rea t nation*
Tonography.
the co n fig u ra t io n  o f  the land o f  a n ation  can add to  o r  de­
t r a c t  fro®  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  un ity* The presence o f  a high tra v ers in g  
mountain chain  w ith  a few low passes can fo r c e  a re g io n a l d e v e lo p - 
re n t  on a n a tion  that i s  a t  once d isa s tro u s  to  n a tion a l u n ity  and 
to  p o l i t i c a l  s tre n g th . One o f  the co n tr ib u tin g  fa c to r s  to  the 
backward s ta te  o f  sany o f  the South American co u n tr ie s  I s  th is  
very  con d ition *  Peru can never hope to  a ch ieve  any h igh  degree 
o f  n a tion a l u n ity  w h ile  the mountains rera ln  the form idab le  
b a r r ie r  they do now* For one hundred f i f t y  years our own 
Appalachian Mountains prevented expansion westward w hile  they 
fo rce d  a fa v o ra b le  c o n s o lid a t io n  o f  the c o lo n ie s  a long the eastern  
seaboard . However, the absence o f  r e l i e f  both  in te r n a lly  and 
along  a n ation *s p eriph ery  can ei courage in v a s ion  and devasta tion *  
Belgium ly in g  a s t r id e  a g rea t p la in  has had to  stand h e lp le s s ly  
by w h ile  g rea t in va s ion s poured in  a t  two d i f f e r e n t  tim es w ith in  
a generation*
D ensity  o f  co p u la t io n .
A r e la t iv e ly  la rg e  p op u la tion  i s  an e s s e n t ia l  eleisent o f  
n a tion a l stren gth? y e t  I t  a lon e i s  no guarantee o f  power today* 
China w ith  i t s  fou r  hundred f i f t y  m ill io n  peop le  cannot compare 
in  power w ith  France w ith  a p op u la tion  o f  f o r t y  two t r i l l io n .
In f a c t  a la rg e  in e r t  p o p u la tio n , sans in d u s try , n a tion a l coh esion  
o r  p r o d u c t iv ity , may d isp la y  an a ctu a l b a s ic  sou rce  o f  weakness 
in  that i t  in v ite s  economic e x p lo it a t io n  or  c o lo n is a t io n  on the
p a rt o f  over-popu lfcted , h ig h ly  in d u s tr ia liz e d  co u n tr ie s  seek ing 
markets f o r  th e ir  surplus goods* To an am bitious Japan, China 
presented  ju s t  such a s itu a t io n *  On the oth er hand, A u stra lia  
w ith  a  sparse  p op u la tion  l e f t  to  i t s e l f  w ithou t a r t i f i c i a l  bar­
r ie r s  would I n v ite  ir s iig ra t io n  and econom ic p en etra tion  by an 
a g g re ss iv e  ov er-p op u la ted  n a tion  th a t ta lk s  o f  " l iv in g  sp *ce* .
Such in v ita t io n s  to  in v a s ion  are as o ld  as the b a rb a r ic  m igrations 
th at moved a cro ss  A sia  a t  w i l l  a few ce n tu r ie s  ago*
Whether d e n s ity  o f  p op u la tion  i s  a n a tio n a l a s s e t  o r  l i a b i l ­
i t y  depends alm ost, e n t ir e ly  upon the degree o f  the u t i l i s a t i o n  o f  
the n atu ra l resou rces  and the p r o d u c t iv ity  o f  i t s  people*
apfl and w ith  the
Sgaafl.-ft.fc..
In i t s  p o s i t io n ,  a cou ntry  i s  e ith e r  In su la r  o r  con tin en ta l*  
The f i r s t  w i l l  con cen tra te  on sea and a ir  t r a v e l , the la t t e r  on 
land and a i r  tra v e l*  Of g rea t  im portance in  determ ining i t s  
com m ercial advantage are i t s  lo c a t io n  w ith  re s p e c t  to  the major 
trade rou tes  o f  the w orld and the development o f  I t s  tran sp or­
ta t io n  system* A l l  the Great Powers ex cep t Russia occupy fa v o r ­
a b le  p o s it io n s  on the p r in c ip a l o cea n ic  rou tes*  These rou tes  
ca rry in g  e ig h ty  per cen t  o f  the w o r ld 's  sh ipping are on the 
A t la n t ic  Ocean* M ilita ry  and com m ercial a ir  power have become 
lea d in g  in flu e n ce s  on a n a t io n ’ s s t r a te g ic  p o s it io n , and both  
lo o k  f o r  every  advantage that w i l l  g iv e  them s u p e r io r ity  over 
o th er n a tion s a ls o  contending f o r  power* With these developm ents 
then have come added im portance fo r  the a lm ost fo r g o t te n  A r c t ic  
Ocean and f o r  the gap between Natal and Dakar on the th ru st-o u t  
hursps o f  South America and A fr ic a  r e s p e c t iv e ly *
-6-
Optimum Condition® for the Rank of Great Power
To be a Great Power it w id seem then that a nation would 
have to be in Europe, Asia or North America where the following 
optimal conditions could obtain* a location in middle latitudes 
where climate runs to neither extreme; nearness to the earth*s 
basic mineral resources, the greater part of which are in the 
northern Hemisphere; accessibility to the trade routes of the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; possession of level, arable lands 
commensurate with the needs of a vigorous and increasing popula­
tion. Furthermore, a cor t act area with a m in im u m  of extended 
salients so that the north-south dimension is about equal to the 
east-west dimension reduces the need for long transportation lines 
and frontier protection. If the densest part of the population 
is located near the center, gradually diminishing towards the 
borders, carrying costs in transporting people, goods and ideas 
are decreased. These factors all play a part in determining the 
policy both foreign &nd domestic that operates to maintain the 
welfare and security of a people.
A Basic Geographic Determinant in Russia1s 
Foreign Policy
In the program of political action followed by Russia for 
the well-being of her people, certain factors peculiar to the 
geography of Russia determine the shape of the policy pursued.
Russia is a huge, continental, landlocked mass, until the 
past quarter century largely undeveloped, situated in an inter­
mediate region where Asiatic and European influences meet and 
iringle* It has an immense perimeter of 36,OOC riles with a ratio 
of three to two between coastline and land boundaries* Its greatest
~7~
e a st-w est  w idth I s  6 ,000 m ile s , i t s  n orth -sou th  3,000* A study 
o f  the map w i l l  show that i t  Is surrounded by 12 states*and 12 
land o r  ice -bou n d  sees* The A r c t ic  c o a s t l in e  a lone s tre tch e s  
a long through a f r i g i d  w ild ern ess f o r  10,000 m iles* A study o f  
Russian h is t o r y  w i l l  re v e a l th a t one o f  the b a s ic  p r in c ip le s  that 
has u n if ie d  the fo r e ig n  p o l ic y  o f  Russia f o r  the la s t  two and 
o n e -h a lf  ce n tu r ie s  i s  t h a t , in  s p it e  o f  i t s  long sea bou n daries , 
i t  has s t r iv e n  co n sta n tly  and c o n s is te n t ly  fo r  irore a ccess  to  the 
open sea*
•3 *
♦ P r io r  to  the r e v is io n  o f  boundaries o f  1939 n ot y e t  fo rm a lly  
s e t t le d  by the peace con feren ce*
•9*
CHAPTER I I  
the H istory  o f  Russia 
The S tory  o f  an Inland People
The history of Russia is the story of an inland people lacking 
contacts with the sea and direct land contacts with tike store highly 
civilised parts of Europe and Asia# By an accident of geography 
Russia lies at the confines of both Europe and Asia without easy 
access to either the Arctic Ocean, the natural highway of Europe, 
or the Pacific Ocean, the highway of Asia* Fro® the very beginning 
of its history it has been isolated from the main currents of 
thought and action that have shaped the western world. It oc­
cupied a large part of the Great Russian Plain in Europe, yet i t s  
chief contacts were with Asiatics rather than Europeans*
Troubled by Invasions f Asiatics nomads.
The people were not allowed to develop in the comfort of 
geographical security for they were frequently troubled by invading 
tribes of Asiatic nomads bent on pillage and plunder* Long periods 
of dry weather that resulted in shortage of pasture and water 
drove the nomads of central Asia westward into Russia* They had 
to bear the complete brunt of defense against those Asiatic hordes 
who would have overrun western Europe but for Russian resistance* 
These Invaders had early discovered the vulnerable frontier between 
the Urals and Caspian Sea and the passageway into Europe south of 
the Black and Caspian Seas* Complete security s not gained until 
the steppes people of south east Russia were conquered in the 
eighteenth century and those of Central Asia in Turkestan in the 
nineteenth* The plains topography that offered no natural bar­
riers, other than dense deep forests and swamps behind which native
p eop les  cou ld  s e e k  s h e l t e r  from b a rb a r ic  in va s ion s  f was fa v o ra b le  * 
to  exp&nsion^but a t  the sum® time o f fe r e d  no v a r ie ty  o f  co n d it io n s  
o r  n atu ra l produ cts that encouraged development* 
nmmtmtnmm of expansion#,
The basic r a c ia l  group was the Slavs stio as e a r ly  as U A* D* 
occu p ied  the area between the Don and Danube Elvers* this group 
forced the t a t e r ia l  fror which modern cultural Bussla was fo ld ed *  
U nlike G reece or I t a l y ,  Russia had no r e s t r ic t e d  er sh e lte re d  
areas of wide open plains that fostered, expansion also in v ite d  
Invasion  by less c i v i l i s e d  peop les* In the ninth century  the 
Norsemen who were ex p lo r in g  the r iv e r s  o f  northw est Russia fa r  
fro®  th e ir  homes in  Scandan&vla came in to  co n ta c t  w ith and con­
quered the Slavs who were expanding along the rivers and over the 
p la in s  from the Sea o f  A«ov north  to the Bneiper Basin and to  
the headwaters o f  the Volga and Oka R ivers* The southern peop les 
had been expanding along a north-south river a x is ,  gaining w ealth 
and power from t h e ir  trade in  f u r ,  h ides and s i lv e r *  Their ce n te r  
in  the south  was K iev and th a t in  the north  was Novgorod# The 
la t t e r  f lo u r is h e d  on I t s  trade  w ith the Merchants o f  Bahsa along 
the B a lt ic  Sea* Kiev was lin k ed  by the Dnelper E lver and the 
B lack Sea to  the Eastern E&pire  o f  Bysantins; (C on sta n tin op le )*
Both th ese  n u c le i o f  Russian cu ltu re  were dependent on co r jm - 
n lc a t io n s  w ith  ou ts id e  Hussie* They were both  so  dependent on 
o u ts id e  co n ta c ts  that they re la p sed  In to  barbarisnr when cu t  o f f  
from the sou rces  of th e ir  power* The H anseatlc League d e c lin e d  
in  im portance when ccw E ercia l rou tes  iroved f r o r  tlie en c lo sed  
B a lt ic  Sea to  the M ia n  t i e  Ocean, and in  the south the Turks 
destroyed  the l in k  between K iev and Bysantium*
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In the e leven th  or tw e lfth  cen tu ry  the f o r e s t  p eop les south 
o f  Novgorod developed a n a tion a l con sciou sn ess  th at culm inated 
In  the Kingdom o f  Muscovy cen tered  around Hoscow* I t  was d estin ed  
to  become the dominant s ta te  among Russian S lavs and the nucleus 
from which Ivan the I I I  in  the f i f t e e n t h  cen tu ry  extended h is  
kingdom to  the White Sea.
2m >B iraU gB  o£ & c e n tr a liz e d  g l l i t a r y  gevernKent.
I t  w&s in  the n inth  cen tu ry  that these peop le  under the 
in flu e n ce  o f  th e ir  N ordic conquerors were a b le  to  o rg a n ise  a 
c e n tr a liz e d  m ilita r y  government pow erful enough to p r o te c t  them 
a g a in st fu r th e r  ru in  by these b a rb a r ic  bands. As time went on f 
th is  c r g a n is a t io n f w hile  removing the ; enace to  c i v i l i s a t i o n  on 
Russian border la n d s , fo s te r e d  a gradual settlem en t o f  areas 
where nomads had form erly  kept the land b a re . E ventually  i t  
made i t  p o s s ib le  fo r  the Bussians to  take advantage o f  the ease 
o f  tra v e l on th e ir  p la in s  land and to  expand th e ir  a rea .
P eriod  o f  Expansion 
Bussla ln tw e lfth  cectury.
At the end o f  the tw e lfth  century  the Bussians had expanded 
t h e ir  area u n t i l  i t  reached from the Carpathian Mountains to  the 
A r c t ic  Ocean. By th is  time expansion had become a h a b it . They 
spread t h e ir  cu ltu re  w idely  but everywhere th in ly , they  acqu ired  
land in  a l l  d ir e c t io n s  and whole basins were taken as they r o l le d  
a cross  tbte g rea t mass o f  E u rtp la . T h eir advance was th a t o f  a 
conquering horde— n ot a s e r ie s  o f  geograph ic ex p ed ition s*  Nature 
and man were th e ir  a l l i e s  f o r  they met n e ith e r  top ogra p h ica l 
b a r r ie r s  nor f i e r c e l y  r e s is t in g  p e o p le s .
1M ,
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In 12&0 a l l  south Russia f e l l  under the f in a l  and o v e r -  
whelming Mongol or  Tartar in v a s io n . At about the same time 
w estern and southw estern Russia f e l l  to  the P o le s , not to  be 
regained  u n t i l  1612* For more than two hundred years they were 
com pelled to  pay tr ib u te  to  a Mongol s ta te  s e t  up on the Volga 
R iver* The invaders taught the Russians nothing o f  v a lu e ; ra th e r , 
they sank in to  a d ep ress ion  and fa ced  eastward* While the Invaders 
e s ta b lish e d  them selves on Russian s o i l ,  the Russians spread over 
a l l  the northern  p a rt o f  th e ir  p resen t European domain, beyond 
the U ra ls , and deep in to  S ib eria *  I t  was f i n a l l y  broken up 
around ikBQ by th e  Huscovy Kingdom tinder Ivan the T h ird , but Mongol 
o v e r lo rd s  continued to  ru le  here and there over much o f  European 
Russia whose cu ltu re  I s o la te d  from the west fo r  so lon g  took on 
an A s ia t ic  c o lo r *
Madwn MPMMion r»f th« « l x t — nth  to  tha n in e t— nth c « n tu r la « .
This can be c a l le d  R u ssia ’ s h e r o ic  age o f  d is c o v e r y , conquest 
and settlem en t*  ih e re  she had o r ig in a l ly  been an A s ia t ic  power 
in  Europe, she now became an European power in  Asia*
Ivan the Fourth , b e tte r  known as Ivan the T e r r ib le ,  reorgan ­
iz e d  Russia under a stron g  ce n tra l c o n tr o l  and made i t  one o f  the 
w orld*s la r g e s t  s ta tes*  Under him, the C ossacks, the Old W orld’ s 
fr o n t !e r s r e n , in  search  o f  fu r  w ealth pushed t h e ir  way in to  
S ib e r ia  through nomadic stron gh olds fo llo w e d  by s e t t l e r s ,  escaped 
s e r f s ,  c o n v ic ts  and fu r  traders*  B efore the end o f  the s ix te e n th  
cen tu ry  they had cro ssed  the Orals, and 16**8 saw them a t  the 
P a c i f i c  Coast* This in v a s io n , now from the w est, was a s tra g g le  
between r iv a l  econom ic system s— sedentary a g r icu ltu re  and nomadism* 
The p la in s  topography and the ea st-w est t r ib u ta r ie s  o f  the S ib eria n
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rivers facilitated Russian advance, but the vast extent of the 
area coupled with its great distance from the sea made the 
expansion gradual* In 1728t Bering, a Dane in the Russian Navy, 
was dlspatehed to the north Pacific where he discovered see otter 
and seals* By 17 k 2 the general outlines of Siberia and the 
Alaskan coast were known* Prior to this time only the rivers 
had been explored* Within thirty years the Aleutian, Kodiak and 
the Pribilof Islands were conquered* Pur companies were organised 
and trading posts set up. An Alaskan fleet was buil^ and hunters, 
farmers, craftsmen and priests were sent to settle along the North 
American coast as far south as California for the purpose of fore­
stalling colonisation by the British and the United States* In 
1825 a treaty set up the boundaries between Alaska and Canada*
In 18**1 Russia sold her landholdings In California to John Sutter* 
In 186? Alaska was sold to the United States* She was finding 
the line connecting her European capital with the western coast 
of fforth America too long to control* In 1898 China yielded to 
Russia the land to the east and south of the Amir River, as far 
south as Vladivostok; she also secured from China a lease on the 
Liaotung Peninsula with the w&rm water port of Port Arthur* She 
was reaching for Korea and extension of a sphere of Influence in 
Manchuria when she encountered Japanese opposition backed up by 
Great Britain* the Russian giant struck first in one direction 
and then in another*
It was under Peter the Great that Russia first reached 
imperial stature* In 1703 he founded St* Petersburg on the delta 
of trie Neva River* He established Russia on the Baltlc^but he 
fell short of the Atlantic Ocean* By obtaining a "window on the
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Baltic” he turned Russian eyes westward with a newly awakened 
Interest in Europe# An historian has pointed out th^t the Dnelper 
River, the highway of Kiev, made Russia Bysantine; the Volga River, 
the highway for penetration from Asia, ssade it Asiatic; and the 
Neva River flowing to the west trade It at long last European# 
Western Europe, however, did not reaet favorably to this new 
activity on the part of the Russians* The Liths, Poles, Teutons 
and Swedes looked upon Russian expansion in Europe as a threat 
of barbarianism against civilization and bent every effort to 
hold it in check* They would hive used Russia as a buffer Kidway 
between western European civilisation and Mongol and Turkic>
cultures*
In the south in trie course of two hundred years no fewer than 
seven wars were fought with Turkey in order to reach the 
Mediterranean by way of Constantinople and the Straits* Turkey 
aided by British might was able to hold back each thrust* The 
history of Russia, In so far as its relations with the outside 
world are concerned, has been, from Peter1s day In 1700 to the 
time of the last Osar in 1917, a persistent pressure to the sea, 
a constant effort to conquer the natural disadvantages of an in­
land situation*
Catherine the Great continued the south and westward expansion 
and in 17S3 wrested Crimea from the Turks* She brought in to the 
Russian fold the Ukranlan provinces, the Transcaucasion States, 
and the lionfs share In the tri-partition of Poland* She sent 
the Russian fleet through the English channel, the Strait of 
Gibraltar and the Medlterranean Sea to destroy the Turkish fleet 
outside the Dardanelles*
Paul, her son, Joined Rape1 eon In a m&d cap scheme on an 
overland march from the Ural River without iraps to conquer India* 
All that he won for Russia in the venture was England^ suspicions 
of any approach by Russia south toward her road to India*
Alexander I, her grandson, Incorporated Finland within the 
Empire and enhanced the prestige of Russia by his defeat of 
Napoleon*
Someone has estimated that Russian expanse at the rate of 
thirty square riles a day w&s accelerated in the eighteenth century 
to forty eight square miles a day* Her expansion to the east has 
its counterpart in our expansion to the west*
MenM-eth .cen.t3mr geaistaoce to. Russian cxrt-nsicn.
After thirteen hundred years the Slav tribes originating 
around the inland Kingdom had spread, consolidated, unified and 
interbred a rather homogeneous r&ce on the Russian plains* By 
the end of the nineteenth century they had thrust their frontiers 
west to the Baltic Sea, north to the Arctic Ocean including the 
Eurasian Arctic coast alisost in its entirety, east to the Pacific 
Ocean, and south to the mountain and desert barriers and the Black 
and Caspian Seas* Their country had reached natural geographical 
boundaries* Only in the west where the Russian plains roll on 
through P o i n d  into Germany were such well defined boundaries 
lacking* Though there were no physical barriers here, the Slavs 
could rake little headway into southern and western Europe* nor 
had they succeeded in "Russianising* the west facing peoples of 
the Baltic*
She had become so powerful that Great Britain was spending 
a great deal of energy and a large part of her national income
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arraying a counter-balance In her support of Austria and Turkey* 
The Crimean War of 1855 was fought and won to prevent Russian 
domination In the Balkans and Hear East*
towards the latter part of the nineteenth century and early 
in the twentieth, she began to lose ground as a great power due 
both to the superior strength of the sea-minded British, and to 
her oeo inept government bent only upon expediency and it# own 
accomodation* In the early eighteenth century the Orals produced 
more pig iron than England, but by the end of the nineteenth, her 
iron industry had become static while England’s had become the 
world’s greatest*
Alaska had been sold and the Crimean War lost* The Russo-Jap 
War of 1905 forced her to give up Fort Arthur, her Manchurian 
Interests, Pacific island possessions, and the southern half of 
Sakhalin* With the defeat of the navy Russian influence almost 
disappeared from the Pacific Ocean*
In 1917 she was headed on a course that threatened even her 
national independence. Internally she counted fifteen million 
dead amid the devastation and ruins of her participation in World 
War I and her own civil war that followed* Finland, the Baltic 
States, and Poland had gained their Independence, Bessarabia was 
ceded to Rumania, Ukraine became seri-independent and self-gov- 
erning republics were set up in the Transcaucasian area* She was 
driven back from the Baltic except for a small sea frontage of 
sixty miles at Leningrad on the Gulf of Finland*
At the end of World War I she had to abandon nearly every­
thing she had won in the last two hundred years on her western 
frontiers, including the life work of her greatest sovereign,
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Petar the Great* Franca and Great Britain seemed to be establishing 
spheres of influence on Russian territory, the French in Crimea 
and the British in the Caucasus area* Japan sought to become*
entrenched in Russia*s Far Eastern maritime provinces and was 
dislodged only through the efforts of the United States who had 
interests to protect in the Pacific* The Treaty of Versailles 
ertected in Europe a wall of buffer states to prevent the westward 
spread of communism born out of Russia9® post war chaos and civil 
war* The European imposed isolation, the economic boycott, and 
the lack of access to the sea reduced Russia*s influence and 
position in Eurasia to a new low ebb*
1— It  reralna her l osses of World J a r  I *
Since 19^0 Russia has in Europe, incorporated within her 
Union the three Baltic States, parts of Finland, Poland, Prussia, 
and Bessarabia in Rumania*
In the Far East she has regained the Japanese half of 
Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, Upper Mongolia and access to the 
two warm water ports o f  Darien and Port Arthur* In referring to 
the borders of present day Russia, Pravda in one its editions 
bluntly stated, *Everyone ought to know that the boundaries of 
the Soviet Union can no sore be questions for discussion than can 
the frontiers of the United States or the state of California*w
Russia As A World Power Today 
Russia has lived under the threat of w r from the time of 
the Tartar Invasion in I2k0 through 19^3 when the Germans and 
Japanese dreamed of expansion at her expense* For centuries her 
history has been an almost continuous series o f  wars, whether de­
clared or undeclared* She has warred first with Orientals like
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the Tartars or Turksf and then with her western neighbors— Swedes, 
Poles or Lithuanians— -who would bar her thrusts towards the Baltic 
Sea*
In 19^3 the English geopolitician, Sir Halford Mackinder, 
in speaking of Russia had this to say, "All things considered, 
the conclusion is unavoidable that, If the Soviet Union emerges 
fro® this war as a conqueror of Germany, she srost rank as the 
grsatest land power on the globe* Moreover, she. will be the 
power in the strategically strongest defense position* The heart- 
land* i s  the greatest natural fortress on earth. For the first 
tisie in history it i s  manned by a garrison sufficient both in 
numbers and quality*"1 
Defeat of Osrasav and the JamlJftME Order*
Russia today has a long frontage on the Baltic Sea^ and the 
defunct German fleet can no longer make of it a German lake*
Gerrany defeated is no longer a threat* The Kazi Mew Order with 
its demand for "living space" in the east is no more*
Defeat o f  Jap m  an d .J^r. CQ~l»ogrw rtty,.3BM rg«
The defeat of Japan frees her from the i&tnediate threat of 
Japan*s curtly phrased aim, "Asia for the Asiatics"* It reduces 
Japan to, and restores Russia to their 1*0* positions* The 
Japanese H&vy destroyed, and Sakhalin and Kurile Islands returned 
to Russia, the Sea of Okhotsk falls under Bussian influence*
Russia*s Far East can turn now to internal development and away 
fror preparation for a defensive war*
♦ ^he heartland extends from the Volga basin of Bussla to eastern 
Siberia, a vast region of forest, grassland and interior and Arctic 
drainage*
1* Sir Halford Mao.binder wThe Round World and the tinning of the 
Peace**— Fcreign Affairs, July, 19^3*
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Russia Is today surrounding herself with a ring of "friendly 
governmentstt— that ist those whose governments she can control 
effectively* In this group fall Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, in Europe$ in Asia, they are* 
upper Mongolia, Manchuria, and Tannu Tava* The extent to which 
Russia has succeeded in adding territory to her Union or sur­
rounding herself with friendly governments is shown in Figure I* 
She is also in a position to bring pressure on turkey for 
control of the Straits that would give her an outlet to the sea*
EjLraL.felMtg.
She has long associated her territorial expansion with a 
"rressi&nic mission of universal dimensions*" In Tsarist days 
with her eyes on the Balkans, it was Pan-Slavism* Since 1917 
it has been comsninisai— a drive "to unite the workers of the 
world in a crusade against imperialistic capitalist*" With the 
rise of the reactionary doctrines in Europe and Japan, it has 
been, since 19^1, concentrating against fascism*
She Is determined to use her weight and strength to secure a*
fair share of the world's coimerce by the eventual attainment of 
open water ports* Between World War I and II in her extreme 
nationalistic economy, she lived Rore nearly to herself than did 
any other nation*' Emerging frost this last war victorious, she Is 
in a position to cake her influence felt around the council tables 
of the world* As a recognised world power, she expects to enjoy 
the privileges of one. She has opened up diploic tic missions in 
Latin America, Canada and Australia and shown a keen Interest 
in the peoples of the Mediterranean and Middle East*
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pOST-WAR RU55IA: HER NEW POSITION IN EUROPE AND ASIA
Figure I.
CHAPfEB III
The Geography of Bussia 
Within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics lies one 
sixth the land mass of the earth* Its i&rense perimeter of 
thirty-six thousand miles encloses an area of eight million 
square riles—— an area almost equal to the entire continent of 
Worth America, It is the largest compact political unit of the 
world; it dominates eastern Europe and northern Asia fro» a 
position that puts Its lend frontiers within a thousand miles 
of more than one half the huaan race* Within its bounds are one 
half she lend of Europe and one fourth of its people. Its east- 
west distance is about six thousand riles. Transferred to the 
western hemisphere, Leningrad would lie ^ust south of Nome, 
Alaska, and eastern Siberia would touch Norway. By rail the 
distance fro® Leningrad to Vladivostcek is a trip of nine and 
one half days*
Physical Features 
Fussia has the longest coastline and the largest continental 
mass of any country, but it is probably also in proportion to 
area and coastline one of the 2:0st isolated* Certainly no large 
country and few small ones are so geographically isolated.
It lies along a margin of the inhabited earth cut off tram 
its neighbors and seas to the south by an lnirense expanse of 
mountains and deserts* The Caspian and 81; cfc Seas ferir part of 
itn so t^ern boundary, b-*t neither c ffers '<■ iireet cutlet to the 
world * s ocean highways for the forrer is an enclosed sea and the 
latter reaches the ocean only through the Mediterranean and Bed
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A nation*? foreign policy, like its domestic policy, is based 
on national po *or* mhe fund^wentel fpctors that condition ration­
al power are geographic rather than humn* The rapid pace of re­
cent history seems to prove that, rt€eof>rs^hy Is the ®ost funda- 
rental factor in th<* foreign policy of the strt*s because it ts 
the ttOBt permanent.*1 'tinisters 9 secretaries of state or dicta­
tors ah&pe policy but, Hire all **en, they Trove on or die* Tn 
shaping a nation’s policy th*y operate in a definite neographic 
area that is permanent and that ht $ specific geographic settings. 
Though e^.n move onf mountain ranges and oceans rerain.
The Geographic -Settings of National Power 
Fro* the geographic area— the one static element in national 
power— spring three other factors that also govern a nation’s 
foreign policy. Briefly they are: (1) the oconoEic factor,
(a) the ie^cgraphic factor, snd <3) the strategic factor* The 
first involves the land and its people considered fros the aspect 
of raw materials, foodstuffs, degree of self-sufficiency and 
standards of living* The demographic factor refers to its pop­
ulation examined with respect to sise and ethnic ©ake-up. The 
strategic factor, or the defensive and offensive potentialities 
of a statefs position, involves physical geography and armsents 
in relation to territorial security. But in shaping foreign
3. ft. J. Spykmaa, , j m x X $ & ± .EglMflfi&t Hareourt
urace and Co*, K* Y* (19^2), p. hi
Sea 3 . Its north facing coastline Is characterised by cold and 
isolation rather then by contact with international ocean route*. 
Furthermore, the long northern coast is separated from centers of 
Soviet population to the south by bleak and boggy Arctic tundra 
and thick ftlroit impenetrable forests# Thousands of miles to 
the east lies the Pacific Ocean with its enclosed fog aM  ice 
bound Okhotsk Sea* In the West, Bussia's only contact with the 
Atlantic Ocean is through the Baltic. Between World "’ars her 
frontage on th*t sea was a sixty sdle coast line on the Gulf of 
Finland*
The "r.ost definite thing in Russian geography is its rivers.** 
In Europe they rise near the center of the country and separate 
as they flow seaward. This proximity of large rivers to e^ch other 
rakes possible an Intricate connecting system of rivers and carals. 
In Asia, the rivers are among the world’s greatest in length, 
area of river basin, and volure* Forty of the Soviet rivers are 
more than six hundred and twenty-one miles in length; eleven reach 
lengths of over one thousand slles. As shown in Figure II, five 
of theft rank In size with the s&ajor rivers of the world*
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Figure II.
rith so many r iv e r s one would expect a great number of 
important harbor*^ but tviere are comparatively few of commercial 
importance. The value of this immense river network Is hampered 
by the feet that so many of ther flow into ice-bound areas, 
enclosed seas, or through foreign dominated lands. In Russia 
twenty-three per cent of the total length of Russian rafting and 
navigable waterways flow southward into the frozen Arctic Ocean. 
This condemns the rich region of European Sussia to continental 
imprisonment. All the Siberian rivers, almost parallel, flow 
northward; even the Amur River which flows eastward for much of 
its length turns northward to the Sea of Okhotsk ©long its lower
course*
The 0*S*3.H . is a vast plain characterized  by an almost 
to ta l absence of r e l ie f  excert a t the periphery* I t  has geo* 
rrap h lc  u n ity  being a combination of three g reat Eurasian  p la in s , 
the "M te  Sea*Caspian P la in s , the Western S ib e rian  P la in s  and 
Turkestan* There a re  rc sharp dividing lin e s ; the low worn down 
U ra ls  running north and south fo r 2500 m iles do net co n s titu te  a 
b a rr ie r*  The u n ity  o f th is  monotonous a rea , as shcnm in  F igure  
I I I ,  is  o ffs e t on ly by d iv e r s ity  of n a t io n a lit ie s , r id e  con trasts  
in  c lim a te , s o ils  and vegetation  and in  degrees o f Is o la tio n *
-2*f-
Figure III.
ErgBtlnrg. >gft, sr4 m »
The eastern  fro n t ie r  due to the absence of great r e l ie f  and
to the d istance  from the developed areas of the west is open to 
invasion* S ince the end of the 19th Century J©panfs growth has
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beec!*»e t potential threat to Russia's Far Fast* Only the com­
pletion of the Trans-Sib# r ia l  Railroad ?«ade th is eastern fro n tie r 
a part of the irre&t nation* The region is  rugged, cold , and 
sparsely settled  but rich  in  natural resources* Since the 
Japanese invasion of China in  1931t the- Russians have bent every 
e ffo rt to develop th is  area, often even at the expense of regions 
nearer to- the populated centers of it s  west.* They have turned 
the Far Sast into a best!on.
The energies of the people, transport f a c i l i t ie s , ag ricu l­
ture and industry have been used for th is express purpose* Spe­
c ia l p riv ileg es were offered to the people to induce them to 
se ttle  in  th is  w ilderness.
Japanese possession of the K u rils  Islands and the southernr • "
part of Sakhalin reduced the naval importance of the Sea of 
Okhotsk. The Russians developed a navel base, though, at 
Petropevlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula as their easternmost 
outpost of defense. This naval base and Murmansk on the Bavents'
Sea are the only two ice-free ocean ports in the whole Russian 
realm. I t  is of limited importance because it is out in fogs 
nearly a thousand miles from the mainland, on a peninsula almost
to ta lly  uninhabited and completely inaccessib le by land.
The western fro n tie r lik e  that in  the east is  also free of 
natural b a rrie rs . Except fo r the Carpathian Mountains, the 
western boundary has p lains topography for i t  lie s  astride the 
grest Eurasian p la in  that sweeps on unbroken from the English 
Channel almost to the P ac ific*  U n til 19*+C i t  was completely cut 
o ff from the sea except fo r it s  single port of Leningrad*
The northern fro n tie r is  e n tire ly  on the .’.re tie  Ocean* Its
high latitude not only isolates the region fro** regular channels 
of world conferee*.but rakes even coastal or local navigation 
impossible tor about nine months of the year* Howeverf the air 
age emphasis on polar routes ray eventually reduce the Isolation 
of this part of the world*
In the south the frontiers are largely sount&in and desert* 
They stand at the circumference of the great Eurasian plain that 
constitutes ®ost of the Soviet* The Caucasus with the Black and 
Capstan Seas for» European Russia*3 southern boundary; the Persian, 
Sinkiang, Transcaspian and Mongolian deserts, and the Hindu Kush, 
*ien Shans and Altai Mountains forir ®ost of its Asiatic Southern 
boundary*
Cli®&te
By reason of its extension over thirty degrees of latitude 
and by its width of over six thousand miles, Russia has air.ost 
every variety of cll&at# with colder areas predominating* Almost 
all of the Soviet Union li^s north of the United States— the 
Black and Caspian Seas are in the latitude of the Great Lakes* 
geapcrature is Continental.
the climate is continental in characterj that is, it is 
characterized by a great seasonal range of temperature* From the 
western border of Russia to the mountain rone of central Asia the 
vast plains lie open to the winds* Oceanic influences, however, 
modify winter conditions somewhat in the northern and central 
part of European Bus?ia^out the Arctic Ocean has no moderating 
effect* Ho high mountain ranges stretch east and west holding 
back the bitter cold of the Arctic winds that come- in over the 
frozen steppes and tundra* In the south the Caucasus mountains
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bar wans tropical winds that would cose in* Mountains equally high 
in Iran and Tibet block warm Indian Ocean breezes* Along tiie far 
East the winds blow almost entirely from the cold lead to the 
warm sea so no moderating influence of the Pacific Ocean la felt* 
During the winter the land mass of Asiatic Russia becoftes 
extremely cold, and practically the whole country has a temperature 
below freezing. The coldest spot in Bussia and in the world is at 
Verkhoyansk in latitude 67 degrees where an official temperature 
of ninety-four degrees Farenheit below zero h«s been recorded* 
k July temperature of ninety-three degrees Parenheit for t ils saste 
spot gives it the greatest range of temperature of any spot on 
earth. One half of Russia has a six month winter* Moscow*s 
temperature averages only 13*3 degrees Fahrenheit in January &nd 
sixty-six degrees in *)uly. Even the Sea of Azov freezes over for 
two or three r onths of the year* Snow lies on the ground along 
the Black Sea area fro* twenty to sixty days of trie year.
SuEi&er is everywhere hot> and there is no place fror Arcr-angel 
to Astrakhan where temper attires do net rise to eighty-six degrees 
Farenheit. Even the souths of the Ob, Lena, Yenisei and Eolcrna 
Hivers at seventy degrees north latitude have an average temperature 
of forty to fifty degrees Farenheit* In the Ukraine the clirate 
Is similar to Ohio*s and further south the winters are even 
milder, especially in the Crimea and on the Caspian and Bl^ck 
Sea coasts where seiri-tropical vegetables, tea and cotton flourish. 
Uneven distributism strain Call*
Precipitation varies in direct proportion to distance from 
the north Atlantic f r o r .  which co » e  the rain bearing winds* HaiB- 
fall except ne&r the Caucasus fountains and th e  east coastal area
is fairly unifort^ averaging about twenty Inches west of the Urals 
and fifteen Inches east of there# A special probler of Russian 
agriculture Is the irregularity in the amount of spring rainfall* 
In trie past when this condition was combined with low snowfall, 
droughts, aiid famines resulted chiefly in south eastern Kussla*
In far northern Siberia rainfall is deficient, the average for
four trillion square Riles is ten inches or less*i
Distribution of Vegetation.
Russia’s great latitudinal depth and range of elir &tcs have 
resulted in a variety of natural vegation that is distributed 
in fairly well defined rones or belts* The nature of these 
vegetation rones is shown in Figure IV*
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Figure IV.
In the north along the whole coast is the tundra, un fores ted 
and untilled* It is permanently frozen at a shallow depth below 
the surface* In the spring the rivers flowing northward fross the 
warmer south overflow their tee bound rouths fend reduce the region 
to a vast swaiRp*
Taiga*
The tundra blends southward into the taiga, an almost is?- 
penetrable forest covering about one half of Bussia fr<& the 
Carpathian fountains to the Middle Urals and fror there to the 
Altai fountains and along the northern boundary of Mongolia* 
they stretch four thousand rriles across the northern part of the 
Soviet with an average width of 600 to 1000 £.iles* About seventy- 
one percent of this vast forest area lies in the Asiatic part of 
the U*S.S*R. It is on the fe^ sis of these forests that Russia can 
claim 1/3 of the world*s forest reserves*
fii&Sifc It*
Southward the forest blends Into the fertile black earth 
belt* It can be roughly enclosed in a triangle of one million 
square irlles that extends fro® Leningrad to the Black Sea eastward 
to Lake Baikal in central Asia; a spur reaches southward along 
the west cot»st of the Caspian Sea towards Baku*
.
This rich agricultural belt merges into the steppes and 
deserts that stretch south into Turkestan* The steppes are the 
grassland home of the Cossacks and their holies* The Ukraine is 
the world’s largest single highly fertile tract excepting, perhaps,
cur Middle Vest* This region has for centuries been a battleground
between Russians and Foies*
Distribution and Character of Mineral Resources.
Russian Is not only continental in expanse, but she also 
possesses some of the world#s largest mineral deposits* !!o 
country is entirely self-sufficient bat the U*S*8*H., like the 
United States, cost nearly approaches that position* In its 
mineral reserves, both in quantity and variety, It is second only 
to the United States* However, in relation to size of settled 
area it is not so richly endowed as are *tmm of the srall 
countries of western Europe* It is, though, well equipped with 
the industrial »usts "— water power, coal, oil and iron**
According to Soviet authorities it holds first place in 
reserves of platinum, oil, iron, and peat, second in coal, gold, 
manganese, alujrinuir, chrorlum, zinc and nickel* The distribution 
of the rore important deposits of these minerals is shown in 
figure V. Heaviest concentrations are along the Orals and in 
southern Bussla^but deposits are spread out east to the Pacific 
coast in the region of the Trans-Siberian Railway*
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Figure V
In  ad d ition  the country possesses la rg e  deposits e f  s i lv e r ,  
Fra phi te , m ercury, b aux ite , t in ,  su lphur, s a lt ,  k a o lin , gypsum, 
and asbestos* S o v ie t geo log ists h&ve worked out processes fo r  
the production o f cadmiuns, nolybdenuR, vanadium, rad iun and 
vran ius*
In  T s a r is t Russia industry was concentrated west the Urals 
on the edge o f the cotin try*  In  1913 the reg ion  around Moscow, 
Ivanov, S t* fe te rsh erg  (Len ingrad ) and the Ukraine accounted fo r 
seventy-four percent of the pig iro n  and eighty-seven percent of 
the coal* The So v ie t Russians in  th e ir  endeavor to rake th e ir  
country econom ically and s t r a te g ic a lly  secure have used a ll the 
s c ie n t if ic  rescurces a v a ila b le  to sound out hidden deposits in  
the great expanse o f A sia* The d is tr ib u tio n  o f these newly found 
deposits around the A rc tic  Ocean are shown in  F igure V I*
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Distribution of Population 
Bussla’s total population of about 200,00Ct0C0 exceeds the 
combined total of that of the United States, Canada, Alaska and 
Mexico by twenty million. In 19kO Russia alone had ten percent 
of the world’s population, fifty percent of I t  concentrated in 
the European sector, west of the Volga River] particularly in the 
Ukraine* However, Russia’s development of Siberia with its 
movement of industry to the east has resulted in  an important 
redistribution of population as shown in figure VII*
*3
Population has centered Cl) along the Trans-Siberian railroad, 
the vital artery which links the new Industrial areas in the west 
and (£} in central, Asia, the site of new Industrial development# 
Xhe population distribution is not uniform for it Is based 
on the distribution of natural resources* In recent years more
- / r'; *
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DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION
Figure VII.
than one hundred new towns each with a present population of over 
one hundred thousand were founded. Some, like Xaranda, a site of 
coal mining, stand almost isolated airong the steppe deserts but 
most, like those in the Kujsnets area9 are grouped together on 
the newly developed coal and iron fields* Others have been built 
as capitals, and some, like Igarka beyond the Arctic Circle, have 
been developed as river port cities as a port of the Soviet 
development of the Arctic region, with improved agricultural 
methods, cany new snail centers are being developed in rural areas* 
In Tsarist Russia the population center was about three thousand 
isiles frost the territorial center* flow with a more even distri­
bution of production, there will tend to be a more even distri­
bution* Industry is going north and eastward and population is 
redistributing itself in the sa&e general direction* During the 
First Five Zear Plan the population of all Russia increased twelve 
percentf in the eastern region it increased twenty-four percent* 
Distribution of Natural Waterways 
The unity of the Great Eurasian Plain is augmented by a 
radial river system whose divides between heads of rivers &re so
♦
low that connecting canals can i:e feasibly constructed* Further­
more, the Soviet river pattern se*rs to have been created to serve 
as a syster of feeders to any east-west railway system* The 
comercial value of this inland waterway syster. is further enhanced 
by the low gradient of the streams, their slow flow, their great 
length and arrangement across the vast plfins* Their use is 
however, restricted (1) by the shallowness of water at all seasons 
due to the relatively scanty rainfall on their basins, (2) by 
their decrease in size as they flow into drier region (3) by the
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long closed season in winter* The dependence of economic life 
upon the rivers is shown by the large number of cities or villages 
along the riversf in tsarist Russia River ports umbered thirty 
five hundred*
Along Russia9* circumference there are twelve seas which 
connect it with the world* However, the commercial importance 
of each of these seas is extremely limited due to either climate, 
location, or political control* Among the larger seas, the 
Caspian and the Black are inland, the first offering no natural 
outlet to world trade routes and the second reaching them only 
through three* foreign controlled constrictions, - the Dardanelles 
by the furks, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Sues Canal by the 
British*
The Baltic Sea is of limited importance also because of 
foreign domination of its entrance - by the British in the Kcrth 
Sea, by the Scandinavians at the point where it enters the Kcrth 
Sea and by the Scandinavians at the point where it enters the 
Horth Sea and by the Germans at the Kiel Canal* the location and 
low temperatures of the Arctic Ocean reduce its commercial im­
portance* the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk lie too far 
from population and industrial centers to the west* Japanese 
supremacy in the Pacific Ocean and heavy fogs and drifting ice 
further handicap these waters*
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CHAPTER IV
Russia's Position With Reference to Open Ports*
Russia like the United States is a two ocean power (three I f  
cne Includes the Atlantic) feeing two ways at once* Two-thirds 
of its tremendously long frontier is on salt water* The coasts 
of its twelve seas (parts of three great oceans) stretched end 
to end are almost as long as the equator. This would seem to
.
guarantee to the great Eurasian land rasa etsy outlets to the sea 
in all directions. However, by accident of geography and by 
political accommodations of peoples on the periphery, Bustla is 
one of the rost isol ted of all countries. It does not have 
anywhere along its whole water boundary lanrestrtcted access to 
the oceans. Over one half of its seas lie north of the Arctic 
Circle and are frozen rost of the year; the retaining ones are 
either landlocked or controlled fey other world powers.
Sea Contacts She Already Possesses
In 1926 Hussla announced that all Arctic territories dis­
covered or undiscovered between 32° 35M East Longitude and 
16B° 1*9* 3* West Longitude to the Horth Pole were Soviet territory. 
&tcept for the waters at ISun&ansk where the coast is open all 
year round, the entire Arctic is closed fo r almost ten tenths 
of the year. Even at Archangel on the White Sea, the border is  
frozen fro® November to May. It is ironical that in  the entire 
length of Hussla#s Ion, coastline only Hur&ansk, north of the 
Arctic Circle and one thousand miles froc* Moscow, &nd Petropavcvsk, 
on the distant and isolated Kamchatka Peninsula, should be ice- 
free all year round. Navigation on th is sea fro» Alaska across
the Bering Strait to Archangel on the ,;vhite Sea m&y be possible 
on a well charted course through August and September* The Lena, 
€>b, and Yenisei Hivers flowing into the Arctic are arong the 
longest rivers of tne world but are handicapped by the northerly
location of their souths9 and are of liriied value to Russia 
because they flow through tundra areas of scant population and 
questionable futures*
In tee Far East seats restriction s cf.v&p&n cua.CllBBte.
In the Pacific tne Russians have slightly greater £art!re 
freedom of action, fheir main port, Vladivostokf the Trans- 
Siberian Railway terminal, can be kept open in winter only by 
ice breakers and suffers even rere than Archangel or Murmansk by 
reason of its distance from the industrial centers. It begins 
to freeze late in December and is not free again until Bay. It 
is on the enclosed sea of Japan.
On the Sea of Okhotskt the Soviet has a considerable ocean 
frontage and its recent acquisition of the Hurlle Islands and 
southern Sakhalin has given it control of the exits from the 
sea to the Pacific. The use of this sea is very limited for it 
is subject to heavy fog fend drifting ice. In this part of the 
Soviet| Petropsvlovsk is the only ice free port.
The new Russian base on Port Arthur on the fellow Sea, 
Pacific Asia's northernmost ice free port, can be reached by land 
only through many hundreds of isiles of Chinese territory and by 
water from Vladivostok only through the Straits of Tushl&a, again 
until recently controlled by *apan*
In the south ireets twndtcaca ..of., topcrrarby aM... i s £ s im J P S M X S .
The Caspian Sea, nearly twice as large in area as our Great
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takes, combines has no outlet to the oceans• In this respect it 
is really an inland lake, with very limited use fo r international 
trade* Seventy per cent of the Caspian intake is  frost the Volga* 
Direct precipitation accounts fo r nineteen percent but a l l  of it 
is lost be evaporation* Records show that its present level is 
forty-four feet below that of 130C* In the north where it receives 
the waters of the Volga, it is shallow and brackish and ice bountf 
for two months of the year* In the south where the water is deep 
and salty, it is always open, and regular sta routes cross it*
The south shores, though steep and rugged, perrrit harbors* ilxcept 
for oil, some ores, and cotton there is little con&erce on this 
sea that lies between deserts and mountains. Baku on the 
European shores of the Caspian Is one of the world*s great oil 
centers* Oil mores overland by pipe line fron this point to 
Beturn on the Black Sea where tankers take it out to the Mediterrean 
Sea for export; other tankers take it fro® Baku to Moscow via the 
Volga Eiver*
The Black Sea receives some of the ro st Important rivers of 
Europe* Its northern shores provide Russia with her longest strip 
of almost ice-free coast* Navigation is possible at all seasons, 
although in spite of ice breakers it is  often Interrupted by ice 
for a few weeks at Odessa* It provides an excellent coraereial 
highway as it gathers trade routes from Odessa, Kherson, Sevastopol, 
Eostov, Hovorossick and Batumi* To reach the open sea they a l l  
have to pass through the Turkish Straits only a M le  wide, run 
the gauntlet of the Aegean Sea, and then go through, either the 
narrows of the Mediterranean Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar, or 
through the Suez and the Bed Sea*
A O -
It is the seat of one of Europe’s greatest political pro- 
bless* The power.play revolves around Russia, Great Britain, 
France, Germany and Turkey* The latter with her control of the 
Straits holds the key* The Straits are so narrow they can be 
crossed with siimll boats cr pontoon bridges but they have been, 
for centuries, the site of struggle between land and sea powers* 
Turkish control of the» has been contested largely by Russia*
As long as Hussia follows an isolationist policy and keeps at 
a ftlnisua her external contacts, the Straits have little political 
significance* Between 16?6 and 1918 the Turks and Russians 
fought eleven wars over control of the Straits, the northern 
Black Sea lands, the Balkans, the heart of the Ottomu Empire, 
the eastern sea board and the Caucasian bridge lands between the 
Black and Caspian Seas* Russia*# attitude towards the Straits 
is tersely suraed up in a foreign minister’s report to his Tsar 
in 1913f "The Straits in the hands of a strong State rean the full 
Subjection of the economic development of southern Hussia to that 
State** The strategic disadvantages of Russia’s landlocked posi­
tion in the south have been emphasized in the two World -ars•
In 191** and again in 19^1 Hussia could receive no supplies through 
the Black Sea* In World tar I the Russian fleet was bottled up 
within the Sea and again in the last war Turkey’s attitude and 
Axis domination of the Aegean Sea closed the Straits to Bussian 
use of the Blfcck-Mediterrsnean Sea route*
In her moves towards the Straits, Rug si a always sheets English 
opposition through Turkey for that insular power ’"ears the 
security of her life line through the Mediterranean Sea both 
w'nose exit and entrance she now controls* A second sea power in
~t*l-
the Mediterranean fro* England’s point of view would rrenace her 
position In that sector of her Empire*
In the Middle East, Russian policy is designed to gradually 
asslc'il&te weak Iran as she has done central Asia by the 
extension of her spheres of infli enee* To secure an Indian Ocean 
port Hussia would need to be ristress of the country behind itf 
through which her coimfunication lay* Again these roves on 
Russia’s part affect England in her coemand of the Persian Gulf 
end in her defense of India* Ever since the days of Tsar Paul 
England has been suspicious of any rove on Russia’s part towards 
Afghanistan and India* Any pressure exerted by Hussia always 
brings resistance fro® England who uses Afghanistan as & buffer 
state against Russian roves towards wars? water ports in the south* 
At no point do Russian and British boundaries touch but, in this 
area everywhere, their interests clash* Hussia as a land power 
seeks outlets to the south through the Straits or on the Ferslan 
Gulf| Britain as a sea power opposes these moves* 
la....t,v?g...wes_t_.ai>g.tg-re3lg.t»R.cs.. established ivuicrear. powers.
the Baltic Sea, abotit one seventh the size of the Mediter­
ranean^ drains about one-fifth of Europe* the Soviet acquisition 
of Baltic States in 19**0 gave her an additional eleven hundred 
miles of coastline in contract to her former wwindow* of sixty 
miles at Leningrad* The sea is in a shallow basin whose average 
depth is only one hundred eighty feet* Due to its shallowness, 
its large drainage basin, its limited intake of salt water, its 
abundance of rainfall and its low rate of evaporation at its 
latitude it has a low salinity which in turn favors freezing for 
almost four ronths of the year*
It Is a ’♦commercial blind alley’1 in that the narrow waters 
through the Kattegat and Skaggerak are the only natural outlets*
The Germans | contenting since the time of Bismarck that the future 
of Germany lay on the water, eat the sixty-one mile 11el Canal 
which shortened the distance to the sea frost the west about six 
hundred miles, and built a Eighty fleet that gav^ her control of 
the Baltic, Incidentally, this canal became such an important 
world highway that i t  M s  seen the passage of as much as seven 
million tons of freight annually. In World ?‘ar I, Hussia In spite 
of her alliance with England and Frame could not prevent the 
Baltic from becoming a German lake but in the diplomacy of World 
War II, when Germany allowed Hussia to absorb the Baltic States, 
she gf.ve up dominance in the Baltic as a part of the Oensan- 
Soviet Pact. However, when Hussia was attacked by Gerrany, the 
former lost her advantage again. The BussIans with their Baltic- 
White Sea Canal have opened a rear exit to the north,but its use 
is limited to the six warm months of the year.
Baltic and the Black Seas and New Hussia
Hussia needs the Baltic ports^but the ports are alao in  
need of Russia. Their prosperity depends on the commerce of the 
vast plains to the east. The coastal region Is closely connected 
with Hussia by way of the Dvina which empties into the Gulf of 
Finland. Three snaln railroads connect the Baltic ports of Blga 
and Libau with the Ukraine, central Russia, and the Volga district. 
In 1913t thirteen million tons of ccmmodotles mere conveyed across 
Hussia1s Baltic border.
sag*
Until iSOl the Turks had prohibited foreign shipping from
-t*2-
entering the Black Sea* that tended naturally to divert Russia’s 
trade to the shores of the Baltic. In lSC2 sixty-seven per cent 
of her trade went through the Baltic and only ^*7 percent and 
percent went by way of the White and Black Seas respectively* 
nth the change in Turkish volley in the south, Baltic trade 
declined from about seventy percent of Russia*s total in 1800 
to below thirty-five percent in 1S90 and thirty-seven percent in 
1913* the bulk of the freight exports, largely grain, was going 
now through the Black and k z o v  Seas since their harbors lay only 
one third to one fourth as far fro® the sain grain producing 
centers than did the northern ones* to a snailer extent, the 
decreased freight going through the Baltic was due to the dis­
appearance of a number of trade advantages during the last decades 
of tsarist Hussia. By 1913 these two southern seas transported 
over t«v*n times as such grain as the Baltic, this trend con­
tinued under the Soviet*
the planned industrialisation of the Soviet union supported 
the historical tendency of this shift from Baltic to Black Sea* 
Industrial activities are moving eastward and southward* the 
Trans-Caspian territory is being developed as a cotton producing 
area; a *second Baku” oil area is being projected between the 
Urals and lower Volga. A planned water connection, the Don-Volga 
canal, will connect the Black and Caspian Seas and contribute 
an increased Black Sea traffic, furthermore, the Soviet govem- 
rent has a monopoly of the country’s foreign trade. It is designed 
to "protect the young, develop'-£ national econoity from economic 
attacks of the powerful industrially developed countries.* This
-Uk~
protection of hoiae industry Eeans a restricted volume of foreign 
trade* Otherwise, foreign goods would delay the Industrialisation 
of Hussia and convert it to a se&i-colonial country* The trade 
is limited to vital imports and the exports with which to pay for 
the®. The abundance of domestic resources plus the numerous 
political obstacles to trade irxposed on her by foreign nations 
led her to develop a nationalistic economy*
Under the new program the Baltic lost it s  export freight of 
oats, flax and butter which were not entirely replaced by new 
cargo. In 1923 eighty-four percent of Baltic imports were coal, 
clay, bricks and building material* These are no longer irspcrt 
articles and are left unreplaced by new freight* The exports of 
Hussia. are largely oil, ore petals, coal anti cotton^and since they 
do not originate in the Baltic hinterland, are finding their way 
out via the Black Sea* The timber which originates around the 
Baltic is now going north towards the Baltic-White Sea Canal and 
the Horthem Sea Route*
In 1935 forty seven percent of Soviet overseas foreign trade 
was carried across the Black Sea, twenty-five percent across the 
Baltic* In 1937 industrial goods constituted fifty eight percent 
of total exports in contrast to Tsarist Russia#s exports that were 
chiefly agricultural in character*
In 1935 as shown In Table I the total traffic of the port 
of Leningrad and of Soviet transit trad# across the Baltic States 
ftftounted to four and one-half million tons or twenty-five percent ✓
of the total.
Zaia&JU
Baltic Trade
Total f
Experts 
Imports
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The exports declined between 1913 and 1935 about th irty  per­
cent $ the fa llin g  o ff of import* was even gret ter* Imports in  
1935 were only six percent of th e ir p re fe r Id ^&r I  volume.
T ransit trade declined throughout the whole period 1931-193$ and 
in  the la tte r  ye&r lo s t f in a lly  it s  transport-economic significance* 
I t  actua lly  constituted less than one percent of Soviet foreign 
trade fo r 193$# h^© per capita foreign trcde of Hussia is  very 
low* In  1930 i t  was seven do llars per person, less than the t of 
-any other European power and only one-eighth that c f the United 
States* It s  to ta l foreign trade in  that year was only about two- 
th irds of that of Belgiuat* th is  low per capita trade can fee 
explained, in  p art, by It s  re la tive  iso la tio n , it s  Inadequate 
transportation f a c i l i t ie s , the low liv in g  standards of it s  pop­
u lation  end In part by the hnge s i sc- of the country which could 
produce w ithin i t  most of the goods needed*
to ta l Soviet foreign trade fo r 1938 Is  shown in  Table II*
urnover Baltic Leningrad Including Transit Trade
with Baltic States. 
1913 13,358,100 6,629,000 6,852,000
1935 h ,600,000 U,23S,COO 362,000
1913 5,851,700 2,**57,200 3,211,700
1935 ' M 31,000 3,785,000 3u6,COG
1913 7*506,Mae 3,812,600 3,6^0,300
1935 **69,600 **53,000 16,600
(American Slavic and East 
European Be view, fclA, 
ffcw. 10-11. Dec. 19^5. YA%)
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Soviet Foreign trade, 1933* 
(in thousands of roubles*)
Country*
Afghanistan 
Argentina 
Australia rbourgBelgium-Luxe
Canada
China (exclude Mongolia) 
C sechoslovakia 
i>enr;ark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germny
Great Britain
Greece
India and Ceylon
Iran
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania
Mongolia
Netherlands
Korway
Poland
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
farmu-fava
T u rk e y
U*S* Africa
United States
Importss Exports! Total— 5
13,716
S226 
50,855 
6k,29k 
3C,6»t9 
65*^61 
19,^22 
5;i*»3ona
7,030
3.M*1
. m m
67,193
63,772
56
17,5978,Mt0 
12,695 
33,510
102,535
9 , 83 1,W60
26,307
S :K
12,671 
22,7 ^ )
559
M?5,858
1**, 763 
312 
7116,803 
1 ,5 *» 7  M*IlW8 
13,231 
27,^32 
1 2 ,  C7*» 
7 ,0 9 9  
1C,815
59 7 ^ 5  
88,327 
3 7 5 , 1 &  
1 7 , 3 ^  %6?6 
57,9^
6,9%
8,79711,6M>
21,626 
7,122 
52.W50 
13,^53 
12,179 
5,393 
22,7*<o 
7,587 
96,7^9
501862 
1*1,097 
32,196 
112,609 
32,653 
32,575 
12,353 
1^,179 
1^,256 
3 9 ,lC l  
155,520 
315, *+33i8;ei8
3,626
121,756
56
2 ^ ,5 t'3 
17,237 2^,533 
108,3 W  
195,383 
31,509 
9,282 
78,757 M>,8W3 
2 k ,C 2 ftj' KlS.
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In that year Its largest imports were fror; trie Industrialised 
United States and Great Britain; Its chief exports to Great 
Britain. Other countries that ranked high as asarkets for Russia 
were Belgltas-Luxesbourg- G««.any, Netherlands and the United
States* These all are countries with an industrial economy; 
Russia*s e x p e rts  today are largely Industrial raw materials and
fuels such as ores, coal, fibers, ti&ber, fertilisers and 
petroleum* Her imports are complex irachinery and tools, oil 
well equipment and pipe, copper and aluminuau
Political factors explain the large foreign tr^de with Iran, 
Mongolia, China, Tarmu-T&va, and A f ghari i s tan -— a l l  out of pro­
portion to population (in souse cases) end internal development* 
these are all peripheral countries with who© Russia seeks 
polltical objectives through the export of automobiles ard trucks, 
cotton cloth and agricultural m chinery*
Leading Ports of Russia
s « n
Of the fifty-one leading ports of Europe in 1937-*-those with 
on©-third of a million or more registered net tons of traffic—  
Russia has only five as shown in Table III*
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a m ja
Fort:
European Sea Forts and Traffic for 1937*
Hotterdas*
Antwerp
London
HamburgMarseille
BakuLiverpool Lisbon Southampton LeHavre Haples Genoa Cherbourg . ‘ . f.u; Bremen Trieste Gvdnia Plymouth
OsloVenice
Country?
Netherlands"...Belgium
Baited KingdomGermanyFranee
Soviet OnionUnited KingdomPortugal
United Kingdos!France
ItalyItaly
KlNMMM
DenmarkGermanyItalyPolandUnited Kingdo®
BorwayItaly
In Mill ions of
m i s  tar Eft, psJf.Jffitm
21.6
21 ,h19.6 
1W.2 
13*8
13.7 
13.311.811.5
l l S
10.0
7.^7.16.U
5 *
5.35.2
ihtajujs+j&A*
Ports Country5 In Millions of
___ ___ . _ . registered net tons*Hull United Kingdom r: rJ * V-Cardiff Unitod Kin^dom W.9
Goteborg Sweden
Glasgow United Kingdom *♦.8
Dunkerque France *♦.5Constanta Rumania U.3Amsterdam Hetherlands •+.3Split Jugoslavia >*.1Boulogne France V.ODouzig Douzig i».o
mirno Sweden ■5 •*> * fStockholm Sweden 3*6Cork Eire 3*6Piraeus Greece 3.5Stettin Genr^any ~ - 3.3Manchester United Kingdom 3.2Dubrovnik Jugoslavia 2.8Bstuss Soviet Union 2.7Cdessa Soviet i’nlon 2*7Bremenhaven Germany 2 *6
Leningrad Soviet Union 2*3Hovorossisk Soviet Union 2*2
F\ii®e Ita ly 2*2
Helsinki Finland 2*0
Riga Latvia 1*2Braila Bu&ania 0.9Tallinn Es tonia 0*9Burgas Bulgaria C*3
Klaipeda (Measel) Li thuania 0*8
Varna Bulgaria 0*7
Liepaja (Libau) Latvia 0*3
(Europe— An Atlas of S m e n  
Geography, 19*^. arfche
R&Jeh&an* 5
She lias only ten percent of the ports but the largest percent of 
the area and population* European Russia has l f607*800 square 
Biles of Europe's total of four million square Mies and one 
hundred forty rillion of Europe's five hundred trillion people* 
Aron# the fifty leading ports of the world in 1935 shown in fable 
3Vt Hussia had none though she has about one-sixth of the land 
surface cf the etrth and one-tenth of its population*
Table IV. Fifty Leading Port* of the World In Order
of Net Registered Tons 1935*
-V 9 -
Hank Port Net tons Rank Port Net tons
(millions)
1* Sew fork 26. Vancouver l!Canada) 1 1 .5
2* London 29.7 27. Hio de Janeiro 1 1 .2
3 * Kobe 28.3 28. Genoa 10.9
fc* jfokahaica 26,8 29. Maples 10.8
5* Rotterdam 22.U 30. Houston 10 .1
6. Baltimore 21.0 31. Sydney (Australia) 10 .1
7* Colombo 20.1+ 32. Newcastle (England) 8.6
8* Osaka 19.6 33. Montreal 8.5
9* Antwerp 18.7 3*. Bremen 8.3
10* Hamburg 18.1+ 35. Seattle 8.2
11* Philadelphia 17.9 36. Montevideo B*1
12* Shanghai 1 7 A 3Z* Piraeus 7*613* Los Angeles 17.2 38. Melbourne 7*6
lV* Liverpool 16.6
8 :
Copenhagen 7*5
15* Marseille 16.6 Portland (Oregon) 7*1
16* Hong Kong 15.3 **l. Bombay 6*5
17* Boston 15.0 ^2* Cherbourg 6. 5
IB* San Francisco 15.0 ft. Capetown 5.519* Singapore lU.8 kh* Galveston 5 A
2G* Buenos Aires 13.^ Batavia h i21. Sew m e a n s 13.3 V6* Jacksonville U.5
22* Duluth-Superior 12. W7* Savannah ^.1
23* Southampton 12.5 V8# Calcutta ♦^.1
2&* Norfolk 12.2 ^9* Cur&c&o 3.7
2 5 * Havre 11.6 5C. Charleston (S*C*) 3.2
"cer.or. 1c Gec.-r?rhy'. ' 19^1. C. F. 
Jones, 0* G. Darkenwald*)
13m. ..iffir-tg-fiaLJl < z^ zoM L $ ±cx & ..
She has only one open and unrestricted port, Marnansk, (not 
including the isolated distant naval port of Petropavlovsk on the 
Kamchatka Peninsula)* On the Baltic (before 19**0) she has only 
Leningrad, one of the world's best ports but restricted, and ice­
bound for five months of the year* On the Barents Sea there are 
Murmansk that can accommodate the largest ocean ships and Petchora 
open from three to four months a year* 0a the White Sea, the only 
large port is Archangel free of ice only five rsrnths* The Kara 
Sea has Igarka and Sovy-Port both open^nly two months of the year* 
On the Pacific Coast there is Vladivostok open all year with the aid
of .lee breakers and Mikolaevsk-cn-imxr open for four months only* 
The Black Sea has several ports: Saturn, an all ye&r round port, 
Hhorly and ILher sont icebound for about three months, Odessa 
and Hovorosslsk both sheltered and open practically the whole 
ye&r* The Sea of Azov has Rostov and Taganrog icebound for tliree 
and one-half months9 Mariupol and EisK clcsei for two eod cne- 
hslf months and Kerch and Berdyansk closed fro* January to March*
Pressure thrusts to Acquire lore Forts or to !£&ke 
Secure These She Already Has
Pressure recently brought to bear on Azerbaijan in Iran— - 
closely tied up with a desire for an additional source of oil 
and for further protection of her own oil in the Caucasus region 
nearby-— would give Russia direct contact with Iraq. This Slight 
at sore future date enhance possibilities cf securing a port on 
the Persian Gulf*
At the end of World War I Russia ceded to Turkey her rights 
to Kars and Ardahan* Her demand for their return stems from her 
desire to protect the ell port of Satu& dangerously near the inter­
national boundary, and to get additional frontage on the Black 
Sea* Too, as long as these areas belong to Turkey they present a 
mountain barrier to Russian pressure southward* These various 
moves for power and ports in southwest Russia are shown in figure 
VIII*
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T H E  W O R L D  FOCU5ES O N  RUSSIA A N O  HER M O  YES IN THE MI D D L E  EAST
Figure VIII.
A CoKKuaist Yugoslavia within the Bussian family of "friendly 
governments* is pressing Italy for Venezia Oullia and Trieste* 
Control of this area would give Jugoslavia and indirectly, Hussia, 
control of the head of the Adriatic* She has also put out feelers 
for control of Tripoli * the Italian colony in Horth Africa* Control 
of this area would give Hussia a foothold on the Mediterranean Sea* 
*oday Russia is demanding anew a share in the control of the 
Dardanelles* Her extensive development of the southern regions 
and her possession of oil in the Caucasus region Increases her 
dependence on the Black Sea and her need for security of its 
outlet at the Straits* Alexander I expressed this need to Hapolecnte 
envoy thus* *If someone should encroach there (in the Straits), 
l:]tjrill not be boss in my house anymore, while it should not in­
convenience anyone if I hold the keys to my c m  house.w
• *52—
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CHAPtEH V
Importance to Hussia cf Access to the Sea*
The Ocean Is the Worldfs Cheapest Highway and Without it
Nations Suffer*
The water part of the globe comprises about seventy-one per­
cent of its area* A nation that hes no contact or only limited 
contact with the earth*s waters is necessarily restricted then to 
the twenty-nine percent or land part of the earth* If the lands 
are scattered and the nation has no access to waters to reach 
these lands, it is restricted even further in its contacts with 
the vast global area* Such was the state of infant civilisations 
of old*
Ancient Civilizations progressed
The history of civilisation is the story cf progressively
larger and larger water bodies* The supremacy of the Egyptians 
on the ffile gave way to that of the Greeks in contact with the 
larger Aegean* Venice and Genoa dominated.western history when 
the Mediterranean Sea w&s the world’s highway* In the European 
drive for the luxury goods of Asia, the land routes across the 
eastern continent and the mter routes of the Mediterranean Sea 
proved inadequate* Attention turned towards the Atlantic Ocean, 
and the lands of its eastern seaboard, first Spain and Portugal 
then Holland, France and England became dominant* They achieved 
this position because of their fortunate location on the great 
new highway* Japan#s dominance of the Far East was feasible be** 
cause of its Insular location on the Pacific and its contacts 
with international coisjrerce moving between Asia and the world*
The supremacy of our country is due In large part fco our unhampered
access to both the great oce&n highways*
The Soviet Union*s desire for open ports9 England*s need 
fo r life lines to maintain some degree of unity and solidarity 
within the British commonwealth of Nations, and our own concern 
for our life line through the Paaa*a Canal and cur determination 
to have a secure position in the Western Pacific all stem from 
the saee idea— national self interest demands free and unfettered 
use of the world’s water highways*
c^eqiL..p.orlg... .naan. aecMA-JaL-figai ....ilthpyl.. .flfiiattflgpttg..
.vSlft£x
access to water does not necessarily Kean access to world 
trade* There are seas that are in favorable positions for trade 
and there are other seas that are in unfavorable locations* Her 
continental position astride eastern Europe and most of the 
northern part cf Asia east to tm  Pacific is such 'that she is at 
a distinct disadvantage in her contacts with international tr&de 
routes* Of all the Great Powers, Russia alone has no direct and 
open access to the principal ocean highways, Atlantic, Pacific 
or Indian. Her position outside the &aln oce&n routes is shown 
in Figure IX*
IvrvvnI
1»-P- Pftcilfcrij a w j  o t h e r  5 (Jur /) i <r A? j e. V V o «- / J~
Nor'trjai t r a d e  la n e s .  TV»« w,JHj o f  fiie L a  nds. is p^opo r t i o n c J  j~Q vol(uc o f  th e .  COln'mecce {it Chi
v v a $  0 ^ r r i c 4  b ef o r e  o u t t r c a  k  o f  W o v M  W a ,  e :
Figure IX.
The Atlantic Ocean whose waters wash European shores accounts 
for eight percent of the world’s ocean shipping* The production 
of the rost important raw materials and finished goods Is equally 
concentrated on the shores of that water* The Baltic, an arm of 
the Atlantic and Russia’s logical outlet to the ocean and its 
routes, is dominated by foreign powers* The same is true of the 
Black Sea* Though she may use these outlets freely now, there 
is always the possibility that in a time of tension, the privilege 
ray be withdrawn and her trade and prosperity left at the r.ercy 
of a second power* She experienced just such a continental im­
prisonment in 1913* Before that date, sixty percent of her grain 
exports went through the Bosporus and Dardanelles* Upon being 
closed by Turkey In 1912, Russian shipping lost eight million 
roubles In a short period*
Saagj 1 ,
trade.
‘hen a people solves its subsistence problems by the develop­
ment of its resources, surpluses are accumulated* These goods 
upon development of internal transportation move across the 
country from one section to another* Finally as production con­
tinues to increase, trade swells and everflews national bounds*
In the natural course of events these surpluses must go "down to 
the oceans and thence to the ends of the earth*w
Furthermore differences In environmental conditions such 
as climate, soil and distribution of natural resources lead to 
a need for trade* The only way in which a nation can make up 
deficiencies In raw material of foods in her own countries is to 
have access to sources in other lands. Without easy access to
other sources and a favorable location on trade routes she is 
subject to other powers who plight withhold their from her* Russia 
is deficient in tin, cobalt and tungsten, and in such tropical 
products as quinine, kapok, natural rubber and copra* If she Is 
to develop her industrial sys teir, she needs to have access to 
such products as she lacks and, likewise^access to rarkets for 
her surplus goods— particularly, in her ease, raw materials and 
foodstuffs*
Access tci the se*...*^.
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A glance at fable V# showing distribution of the world’s 
merchant marine, shows that largest merchant m&tines are owned by 
those countries In direct contact with the northern Atlantic or 
Pacific (excepting Italy and Greece in the Mediterranean).
s m s U L
Distribution of tonnage of World Merchant Marine, 1936*
Qountrv:
Great Britain 26*5
gounfrry.:
Brasil
' --fr-r
o*7
United States 19*2 Panama 0*7
Japan 6*5 Finland 0*7
Norway 6*2 Belgium C.6
Germany ?•§ Yugoslavia 0*6Italy h *B Argentina 0*5
France *+*6 Hong Kong °.5
Netherlands 3*9 India & Ceylon 0.H
Greece 2*8 Portugal 0*^
Sweden 2*3 Turkey 0*3
l*S.S*R* 1.9 Latvia 0*3
Spain 1*8 Chile 0*2
Autralla 4 New Zealand 1*0 Estonia 0*2
Denmark 0.9 Poland 0*1
China ,  0*8 , Bui^nla.... . .. .._____ __ . - jQjJL- .
(Elements of Political lecgraphy
19Mf, VanValkenberg S*)
Russia is net included assong the first ten, yet her area is greater 
than their combined areas and her population exceeds that of any 
one of the countries. Moreover except for the United States, her
population exceeds th a t of even the ro s t densely populated cf th a t 
group by alm ost one hundred twenty-five million.
Her sm all but growing f le e t  p lie s  in  fo re ig n  waters and a 
s e l l e r  f le e t  serves the Caspian Sea rcu te s , —  north  and south 
between Astrakhan &n& Bander Shah in  Ira n  and east and west be­
tween Baku and Krasnovodsk* Since i t  l ie s  o ff  the p r in c ip a l lanes 
o f the w orld , moat o f i t s  commerce is done w ith  coun tries near a t  
hands namely United Kingdom, N etherlands, Belgium and France as 
shown in  fab le  II#  The United S ta tes  is  the cn ly  country a t  a 
great d istance w ith  whom it does a la rg e  overseas trade* I t s  
overland trade w ith  i t s  European and A s ia t ic  neighbors is  more 
va luab le  on the whole than i t s  seaborne trade*
From Saturn, Rostov and Odessa ships go to the east or western  
M editerranean v ia  the S tra its *  From Leningrad v ia  the !*orth Sea, 
ships go to Ice land  or fa rth e r po ints on the North A t la n tic  routes 
or to London and other ports o f Great B r ita in *  From Murmansk and 
Archangel boats s a i l  across the A tla n tic  or go south through the 
North Sea to H u ll and other ports o f western Europe* P o s s ib ilit ie s  
fo r  routes from !*5urmansk eastward v ia  the A rc tic  and the Bering  
Saa* to the U n ite ! S ta tes or to Yokahama an Vladivostok v ia  
Fetropavlovsk are being explored* From V lad ivostok sea routes 
go to co asta l ports on the con tinen t and west coast o f Japan*
Oceans are Highways— Not B a rr ie rs  
The oceans of the world are one and access to them brings a 
people in  con tact w ith  the whole world* Tremendous advances in  
communication and tran sp o rta tio n  by land , sea , or a ir  have made
the world even sm aller* In  1620 by s a i l  i t  took six ty-*  
to cross the A tla n t ic  Ocean; the f i r s t  steamboat in  1833 crossed
-5 3 *
it in fifteen days* the Queen H&ry In 19 3 8 cut the time to four 
days* M r  nays that go over tbe ocean have reduced the ti»« still 
further— the Clipper In 19^0 made the trip in twenty-eight hours 
and in 1 $V3 the distance was traversed in four hundred minutes# 
rhe days when countries could withdraw into themselves behind 
their oceans have passed* All people are citizens of the world, 
economically, if not yet politically*
Hussia*s lack of ports has isolated her geographically* 80  
nation has been so deeply committed to national isolation* Her 
great variety of resources, due to her immense sise, has made it 
possible for her to develop in a state cf comparative self~suf- 
ficiency* Hiis isolation, either natural or imposedt has made 
it difficult for the western world to understand Hussia or for 
her to understand it*
Access to the Sea Would Enable Hussia to Develop a Defensive and Offensive Sea Power
Open ports would give Russia naval ovtposte— defensive
• -’itions with respect to the approaches I sslan l*a& M b
Hussia like the United States has had to face water approaches
frop. two (perhaps three) widely separated seaboard,?, but tin!ike
the United States, she has no Panama Canal that serves as a 
connecting influence*
Fvery great nation fr^n the days of Carthage to present day 
England has stretched o\st for sea power* Buss la is like a riant 
confined within geographical bonds who has, since'Peter the 
Great, dreamed of the time when it could reach cut to the open 
sea.
From 1®89 to 190** her navy stood third in rank after rngland 
and France* the Busso-Jar :’er in 190^ t^?..s ireaE, ui sea
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power* In 19lV the navy as shown In Table VI was sixth among 
world powers*
Ship-building facilities were limited to a few yards anl plants 
and the purchase of war ships abroad was Halted by finances*
Ail tb» main outlets to the sea, except probably-those In the . 
Par Bagtf could be barred by foreign powers or by ice* Hussia 
was really a land poorer* the Revolution of 1?17, following her 
participation in World Tar It completely disorganised the naval 
establishments* From 1917 to 193*+ the navy attracted little 
attention* -hen Germany’s fleet in the Baltic and Japan’s In 
the Far East became a menace, Hussia began the construction of 
a defensive navy* The weakness of her sea arm became apparent 
in 1935 when Soviet assistance to the Loyalists In the Civil War 
of Spain m s  very limited* Her naval strength prior to ?orld 
Par II as compared with that of other great powers is shown in 
Table Til*
i*aval Strength of Leading Be a Powers, July 1, 191***
Japan
Russia
Italy
Omrmny
Franc#
United States
Great Britain
Fr#«*War lavies of the L&jcr Powers*
Country Tonnage 'Capital Aircraft Class A Class
_ _________ ____  ~jgtejL -ffrtoiL, <J2suxJj§£s a c u t a mLn*land 1.^5,*73 17 7 15 9*
Japan 382.172 11 6 13 26
Franc* 793§086 13 3 9 13
I t a l y  521,0^5 6 ' 16 19
Garaaay 223,7l*2 9 2 3 p
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Table VII
Russia 20h ,762 3 1 2 >+
U . 3 tt. tas 1 ,^ 2 9 , 7**Q 17 6 ---------*+0---------
England
Japan
Franca
A&aija0*£m&|is
gft •■ <-■ ■/- i;- > 68 22lSL..iS£2SlS332
115 62 233
ftl 3S 2*9
110
2 5^
02
97
199
*»C5
1 - (New York Y li-ea, lia r . 3, I9 3 7 T
In 1936 she decided to build a large navy* Daring the ^rr years 
while the United States and England added to their sea strength, 
Russia was not able to make good her naval losses* Today Germany 
and Japan are no long#? a menace but she will irieet England and 
the United States everywhere In  Europe and Asia. She Is develop­
ing Vladivostok, Komsomolsk and Khaborovsk as potential ship­
building yards In the Far East, Nikolaev on the Black Sea and 
Leningrad and Xrondstadt cn the Baltic.
Russia htz little in the way of oceanic shipping or outlying 
possessions that, would require protection c f a high seas navy.
Her sea power mild be vital only for defense of local and un­
connected sea frontiers which would Ftean sea power of a coastal 
rather than oceanic character. Her weakness at sea is not danger* 
ous for she is  practically self sufficient as far as strategic
—
raw materials are concerned* Her weakness lies rather in her 
Internal transportatl on— 11 needs to be both Increased and Improved*
Hussia Is not in a good position to develop an offensive navy* 
She is hampered by both location and disrate* Her huge sixe, 
too, makes access to her coasts difficult fror. her land side*
It would be, under these handicaps, difficult to become a sea 
power as comparable in magnitude as her land power* The latter 
extends from the Pacific Ocean to the Elbe River (19^6) and fro* 
the Arctic Ocean to the great desertHsouatain barriers of Middle 
East and inner Asia* Without portals on the Indian Ocean, control 
of the Mediterranean or the Straits, she is severely handicapped* 
Farther drawbacks to such aspirations are: (1) her Arctic ports 
are open only a few months a year, (2) her Pacific frentier is 
faced by foreign controlled offshore islands5 Aleutians,
(3) the Baltic Is landlocked, (b) access to the Atlantic Ocean is 
possible only by ray of distant Kur&aask and the Horth Cape, (5) 
the discontinuity of her R&riti&e frontiers would involve long 
end f8?&gfi«.
Russia has never built a powerful navy or irepressive merchant 
marine* Apart from her temporary occupancy of Alaska and the 
Aleutians and her brief tenancy of < ur California cofcst, she has 
never acquired overseas colonies* Her growth has been land ex­
pansion* a process of conquest and colonisation of contiguotis 
territory* However, in this age of powers vieing each other- for 
supremacy, is an offensive weapon that enables its
possessor to carry on offensive operations over seventy percent 
of the globe, and to deny this opportunity to any land bound 
opponent*
Hussia1* Internal and Coastal Area Development to Realise 
Maximum Returns from the Forts She Possesses
In 190C Hussia was the most backward of the major countries 
in Europe# Much of its history had been a record cf struggle to 
escape from the land-locked position of the early Muscovite King* 
do® which had no maritime cutlet except the Arctic ocean* Even 
after the Russian Empire* at the price of exhausting wars, had 
conquered the shores of the Baltic and Black Seas, it had only 
gained access to closed bodies of water* Her general Industrial 
development was at a low levelj her transportation system was 
planned to serve interests of foreign trade rather than the 
domestic economy| agriculture was in an extraordinarily backward 
state and natural resources were hardly exploited* -Per capita 
production and consumption trere low* the Revolution saw the 
overthrow of the old refine and the Communists in power. They 
set cut to build "Socialism in one country.* That reant Russia 
must be »ade strong and Independent of foreign influence or 
capital* She wes to tske the assets she had and develop them 
to overcome the liabilities,*— chief among the latter being the 
lack of good ports and the great distances between those ports and 
centers of population and industries* The program was mapped out 
in th#s various Five fear Plans*
The First Five tear Plan, running from 1928 to 1932* laid 
stress upon (1 ) increased production of raw materials, (2 ) col­
lectivization of agriculture, (3) manufacture of machinery,
(b) improvement of transportation* The Second Five Tear Plan from 
1933-1937 was to have placed greater emphasis on consumer goods
hut, due to the $a&i renace in Germany, stressed instead concen­
tration on the arrament industries* Water power and coal were on 
a large scale converted into electricity and nesr manufacturing 
centers were created particularly in Siberia and the Urals* 
Development of Transportation Brings Far-away Ports 
Hearer to Population and Industrial Centers 
In an age of cheap ocean transportation and expensive rail 
transport, Hussia is at a distinct disadvantage* However> her 
position ar una the Arctic Sea in an age c f air travel is superior 
as is shown in Figure X*
Gr.f tfcnnC*----6 lofe q.f Geoj ra-fhy .
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Figure X.
Her s ix  thousand ?rile  east-west d ire c tio n  fror? V lad ivostok to  
Moscow Is  tw ice the d istance trow, few York to  San Francisco* 
V lad ivostok , her largest easternm ost c it y ,  Is  re a re r to S e a ttle  
than to the S o v ie t c a p ita l*  I t s  sheer s ise  u n t il the hull ling 
o f a tran s-con tinen ta l railway had a numbing in flu en ce ; nor was 
there any p o s s ib ilit y  o f a r r iv in g  a t u n ity  by the development o f 
coastw ise tran sp o rta tio n , Russia was fo r cen tu ries in  a **chron ic  
s ta te  o f a rrested  deve lop j^n t*" the enormous unbroken a rea , 
the long d is jo in te d  c o a s tlin e , the severe c it r a t e ,  and seasona lly  
frosen waterways not on ly rade in te rn a l development slow but cut 
o f f  a lso  fre e  communication w ith  the outer world* However, n a tu ra l 
conditions were ve ry  favo rab le  fo r  ra ilro a d  b u ild in g , Sxcept fo r  
such extended s a lie n ts  as the Kamchatka Pen in su la , Transcausasis 
and the Par-Eastern  tongue north o f Korea, the country is  remark­
ab ly  cofpact* The absence o f n a tu ra l obstacles throughout the 
w idth o f the country encouraged ra ilro a d  construction# The u n ity  
c f  p la in s  topography had developed a r iv e r  system that le n t i t ­
s e lf  te can a lisa tio n *  Furtherm ore, the general trend o f the 
r iv e r s ,  south flow ing in  Europe and north flow ing in  Asia, aug­
mented the east-west trend o f ra ilro a d  b u ild in g . Hoth development 
o f r a i l  and w ater transport was In fluenced  by the need o f bringing  
d is ta n t seaports nearer to in land  population centers* rtussia#s 
p o s itio n  w ith  i t s  westernmost po rt o f V lad ivostok would be cois- 
p a ra tle  w ith  on* s itu a t io n , \f our westernmost o rt s t
Alaska^and cur r.ost eastern  port were on the Nor^c^ian co ast. 
g«velopsent and d is tr ib u tio n  of rallwuya.
though Russian expansion reached the P a c if ic  Coast as e a r ly  
as 16^8, co lo n isa tio n  o f lands east o f the U ra ls  went very s low ly
—6
until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The final 
conquest of Turkestan In lB8l established Has?Ian political 
control over the whole cf Siberia, then Russ if turned her atten­
tion fror expansion to consolidation c f her vast Hfeplre. The 
building cf thr? Trans--Caspian Railroad of 1680 and the trans- 
Siberian in 1^91-1906 speeded up the process. The latter with its 
temini at Vos cow and Vladivostok gave Hussia a geographic ad­
vantage she had long sought— a port or an. open ocean, although 
it was still nine days* rail travel away. The Trans-S iberian 
R.H. was Russia’s "Panama Canal." It is the longest line on 
earth* Construction began simultaneously from east and west but 
it was not completed until thirty years after cur own Union 
Pacific. For the first time connections between various parts 
of the Empire were possible at all seasons of the year. The 
extent to which* she has covered her area with a railroad net Is 
shown in Figure XI.
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Few Siberian railroads take a northerly direction but In crossing 
the country frcas the east to west they co&pleirent the north-south 
rivers ami give Siberia a water-rall transport systern# Double 
tracking the Trans-Siberian system has only recently been completed 
'.the Chinese Eastern Railroad {not completely shown in Figure XI) 
cuts directly across Manchuria to Vladivostok (opened to traffic 
In 19C3)* A new line Is In process of construction from a point 
on the Trans-SIberian rest of Lake Baikal, thence north of the***
lake through the iron, coal and gold fields of the Lena Basin 
to Komscmolsk on the lower Aisur and on to the Pacific at Scvet- 
skayar Gavan (Soviet Harbor)* This gives Hussia access to another 
Far Eastern port* Two other railroad lines go fro® Moscow south 
of the Trans-Siberian railroad* T m  South Siberian Railroad 
extends eastward from kagni togoy^k iron field to Stalinsk in 
the Kusnets metallurgical center* A spur fross the Trans-Siberian 
reaches southward fror. Petropavlovsk (in central Hussia) to the 
Karaganda coal fields and trie Lake Balkhash copper fields* An 
east-west line extends southeastward from Moscow through the in­
dustrial area of the Volga to the oases of Central Asia where, 
near Tashkent, it Joins the old Trans-Caspian Bailroad built 
eastward from the Caspian Sea* It also connects with the new 
Turkestan-Siberian line which provides direct cosaunication be­
tween Central Asia and Western Siberia* Other lines run (1) fro® 
Moscow to Baku, (2) to Beturn and other Black Sea ports of the 
Ukraine area, (3> to principal cities in the west to Leningrad,
(k) northward to the White Sea and to Murmansk. Moscow, Leningrad 
and Sverdlovsk are the chief centers of tliese rail networks* A 
number of railroads has been laid to tap mining areas or to
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facilitate the reciprocal use of natural resources as in the 
Urals-Kuzbas Co&binat*
That there are no railroads to Iran, Afghanistan, and India9 
andf that the one line to China is only a short cut to the Soviet 
Pacific rather than an avenue of tr&de to China9 further illus­
trates the degree of Russian isolation* Its railroad net is In 
contact with central Europe at several points, but the gauge is 
different from that of adjacent European states except in one 
instance of an outlet lin e  to an ice  free port cn the Baltic*
The Soviet railroad mileage* serving an area tiro and a half 
t im s  larger than the United States, as shown in figure XIX9 has 
only one fourth as much trackage, but, to extent, it is second 
only to the United States*
•6 9 *
Figure XII.
In  1913 shown in Figure TTTI the to ta l ^ilenge of the 
railways? tras 3” 5351.*
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Figure XIII.
The various Five Year Flans have seen about twenty thousand pile# 
added and an increase o f  freight turnover of almost four hundred 
r i"H e r  tons. There was an increase o f  sever hundred rercent in 
passengers carried* The railroad mileafe Increased by fifty per­
cent between 1913 and 10^0 and the a*ount of freight carried by 
four hundred percent* These f ig u re s  night have been even higher 
had the Soviet not initiated a rational distribution of industrial 
centers coupled « § th an increased,regional self-sufficiency to 
lessen c o s t ly  distances over whieh materials rust be .hauled*
*
The inland waterway system of Hussia is M U  extensive than 
that of any other country. The total length that could be de­
veloped f o r  water traffic Is two hundred seventeen thousand miles 
w ?ich  sixty-eight thousand ^iles are navigable by steamer. Inland 
waterways now in  use total fifty thousand riles, tt carries about 
n in e ty  willion tons of freight ^hlch  is about ten per cent of tota l 
freight roved. Hauls consist chiefly of tirber, grains, oils and 
ores* By the end of the First Five Year Fianf freight turnover by
water had increased tMrty-elght percent over 1913#
the system is not free from handicaps * Every stream in the 
land is ice-bound at some time during the winter. The Dneister 
is ice bound for seventy days a year, the riddle and upper ?ol.ga 
and all rivers in Central Russia from l*fC to 160 days and in the 
north from five to nine months* The level plelns cause all Russian 
rivers to flow sluggishly and to have very shallow channels. More­
over, their use for foreign trade is U n i t e d  since they flow into 
Ice bound waters such as the Pacific and Arctic, a closed sea, 
the Caspian and into the Bis ok and Baltic, both of which have 
outlets under foreign control#
s£he Volga is first in Importance with the oil and wood it 
carries upstrearr, and the wood it carries southward* Second to the 
Volga are the Keva and Svir which link Lakes Ladoga and Onega*
The first including tributaries with their seven thousand miles 
of navigable length drains one half ndlllon square isiles and serves 
fifty million people living in the basin*
the radial system has rrade feasible an extensive canal program* 
fngineers have ssade a seaport city of inland Moscow} it is linked 
by river and canal with five seas— Caspian, Black, Baltic, £hite 
and Asov* Some of the projects are not yet complete, however* 
Moscow, on the fiuscova which joins the OKa Eiver, a Volga tribu­
tary, Is connected by canal witn the latter as shown in Figure XI?,
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The Tolga-Uoscow C&nal completed la 193? i* eighty miles long#
When the llWi1 THIjj canal is completed Moscow can reach three 
southern seas by water*
The Stalin Canal from the White Sea to the Baltic and Lenin­
grad Bakes unnecessary the long sea trip- t r a m  Leningrad to Murmansk* 
Moscow connections with it bring it access to two ether seas* The 
Dneiper has canal connections near its source with southern Dvina, 
the Wetm m  and the Vistula* Thust freight can go by waterway fror, 
the White or Baltic Sees to the Black or Caspian*
This extensive canal~riverway syster: is © response to Russia*# 
scarcity of good roads , inedequeteness of railro 1 mileage y paucity 
of open ports and to her great distances# Ports are tans "brought” 
inland nearer to centers of protection* to avoid long overland 
Journeys with their high rail transportation cos s* There is no 
competition between various forms of transport for all of tmm are 
a part • f the unified transport system', of the country *nd carry 
out the work of the Flan*
the highways of the Soviet are not very well developed* In 
proportion to area the United States has about twenty tlt.es their 
length* In 193St the mileage totalled eight hundred forty thousand 
of which only sixty thousand were surfaced with gravel or stones 
fend two thousand four hundred with asphalt* 4 natural shortage 
of building atone explains the predomination of natural dirt roads* 
it would take Hussia from fifty to ;:ne hundred years v; buildf at 
aer present rate, a system of highways comparable to our own*
acutes in operation covered ©lg,*ty-six .thousand eight hundred
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miles in 19M+* Soseow was linked with all Important centers In 
Siberia* I n  1935 Hussia was ninth in air transport c f  p a s s e n g e rs t 
freight and rail carried as compared with eighteenth in 1932*
Prior to  the war, its civil aviation ranked second only to that 
of the United States*
the TJ*S«S*fU lies off the course of the- principal world air 
routes as they existed in peacetime* Its r<ain line from Vladi­
vostok to Moscow was connected by branch lines with the western 
fmpman cities tff Stockholm* Berlin w A  Prague, i n  important 
north-south line from Moscow to Tashkent and Samarkand in C e n tra l 
Asia is connected by way of Kabul and Teheran wiva the British 
Imperial Airways*
Development of the Arctic Regions 
The center of the northern hemisphere is, of course, the orth 
Pole in the Arctic Ocean, Only a globe or a rap of the north 
polar projection such as Figure XV will show how true this is*
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The Arctic Ocean is an inland sea* Surrounded by three continents, 
it is & ?f >%diterrane&n" of the world, The capital cf ever:/ power­
ful nation in the world is nearer to the Arctic Circle than it i s  
to the equator* Like Europefs Mediterranean Sea it has two cut* 
lets— one the Bering Strait only thirty six riles wide into the 
Pacific, and the other between ITorway and Greenland, nine hundred 
Riles wide, into the Atlantic*
No known civilizations in the past were sheltered aroimd its 
shores as in the case of the -jrarst »diterrsnean, but the pivot of 
future history m&y center over this area since the three Greet 
Powers, United States, (in Alaska), Hussia and Or* it Britain all 
face It* Nearly two thirds of the sea Is covered at all season* 
with a thick layer of pack ice th- t slowly drifts with a circular 
action from the direction of the Bering Strait towards the coast 
of Greenland. The rest along the continents* shores is more or 
less open to navigation (with aid of ice breakers) for a period 
of three to four months in late turner frcn July to September*
The only part of this vast area which is entirely free of ice 
throughout the year is the eastern part of the Greenland Sea and 
a strip along the north coast of Finland and Hussia near the entrm* 
of the &hite Sea and including Murmansk* Muriaaask, deep v<i thin 
t,he shelter of Kola Bay, gets the benefit of th# warn Horth 
Atlantic Drift* It is free fro& ice all year round having the 
average annual temperature of Moscow— 35r*&c^ *— nine hundred 
Biles south*
aiw U*S*8*B* nas a special interest in the Arctic for it is 
the j/iost direct; Leans oi* eosmmi cation by %ater bat^een astatic 
and European ports of its own territory and as a m u m  of access
to the outside world that is not subject to foreign domination* 
through i t  l ie s  the ftortheast Passage, a continuous ocean 
route around the north o f the Old World and the Northwest Passage 
(discovered one hun ired years ago) around the north o f the Hew 
World* there were three occasions in the past when explorers had 
negotiated in Europe the northern journey by water though not In 
one season -  Kordenskjold, a Swede; Yilketsky, a Busslanj and 
Amundsen, a Norwegian# the Russians Imve developed a sea route 
across i t  but the Arctic of the future ray be not of the sea but 
o f the air* The Arctic revolution was precipitated by the a ir -  
plains #hieh cun- fin*;! better flying conditions at lo m r  a ltitudes
• ver polar areas than at the equator* Planes can f ly  air; os t 
every day of the year without being seriously handicapped by 
weather* The Soviet h&s fiv e  a ll-y e a r  routes here* Tis.e r ay 
prove that air transportation over the Arctic w ill free Hussia, 
at l i s t ,  froii i t s  geographical isolation* Future travellers  
riding the great c irc le  air routes tmy leave Seattle or Detroit 
and arrive in any Siberian c ity  within twenty-four hours less  
time than it  takes to travel by ra il from Boston to S t, Louis* 
0ranlra.i;p.J&g...0g*fe.t Northern Sea Route.
As far back as the discovery of America, Russian leaders 
were seeking a northern route to China by way of the White Bea* 
Though such a passageway was discovered two centuries before, it 
was left to the Russians of the present generations to develop 
such a route in the face of airost unconquerable obstacles* I t  
Is vc 'M heyo«:l cl is  put# ateria l elenent lr the strength cf the 
Soviet Union* A eth er cr not i t  ever becor es m& artery of 
safe navigation for conferee, i t  has great strategic value* One
of the rost Important ocean routes of “crld War XI from Horth 
America to Europe skirted Iceland and rounded Sorth Cape to the 
Soviet Russian ports of Murmansk and Archangel* Polar winters 
last nine ronths but polar summers have long sunshine* The delta
r
building rivers that lead to the sea are often floods by summer 
and bands of ice by winter* Ha11reals that would Join the hinter­
land to the Arctic seaboard present problems in their construction 
over the swa&py or frozen tundra* Folar ice is a treacherous 
enemy*
In the forty-four years from 1B76-1919 only fifty-five 
thousand tons of cargo passed along these icy waters but from 
1933~193^« one Eillion two hundred thousand tors were transported* 
the safety of the route is attested by Lloyds of London who in 
1921 quoted six percent Insurance rates for a cuch shorter passage 
between Dickson Island and Archangel* Today the whole passage is 
insured for eight tenths of one percent*
The route was opened by the Soviet Union in 1932 and linked 
with three principal Siberian waterways, - Ob, Lena and Yenisei- 
each several thousand sdles in length* It provides the shortest 
sea passage from European Hussia to Far Eastern Siberia— fro© 
lurmansk to Vladivostok - a distance of five thousand six hundred 
seventy-one miles* Around the Indian ocean or the P a n a m  Canal 
the distance is fourteen thousand miles* Fro® Odessa to Vladivo­
stok the distance has been cut to nine thousand three hundred 
miles*
Fro* west to e^st the r ute after leaving Murmansk goes 
through Barents -Sea as shown in Figure XV and then through the 
straits of lovsyt Zecelya into the Kara Sea which gives access to
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Steel (in millions of tons)
Total Production*...............17* ^  ......
Per Capita 106 **17
tr€*&d
j .'::.. - ..............  ......  : '35-
Per Capita 8 os* 6 1/1C lbs* 
£inc
Total Production.............. 50,300 ...... '490,000
Par Capita 8 os* 7 3/5 lbs.
hlujBimuB
total Production .............. 33*000 ...... 112,200
Par Capita 6 02* 1 3 A  x& s.
Copper
total Production.............. 69,63c ......
Per Capita 13 l A  02. 10 1/3 lbs*
Nickel
Total Production............... 1,980 ...... 110
Per Capita 1/2 02* 1/36 os*
Pig Iron and Ferro Alloys
Total Production.......... 15,83^,500 ....... 3^,679,700
Per Capita IBS lbs* t+2 lbs*
,,3 ': •
Total Production........... **,798,200 .... 7,910,100
Per Capita 57 1/8 lbs* 123 1/2 lbs*
Asbestos
i rocluction............. 137,210 .
Per Capita 1 ?/o lbs* 2 3/** os*
Cadmium
Total Production ..............  13 1/5 • •• 2,133
Per Capita 1/350 oz. V 2  <>«•
Magnesite „ ,
tal Production..............530,200 ...... 206,690
Per Capita 6 3/10 lb§« 3 1/5 lbs*
Potash
Total Production.............. 210,300 ..... 192,500
Per Capita 2 1/5 lbs* 2 lbs*
natural Phosphates
tot ,;*oductlon........... 436,600 ........ 3*593,700
Per Capita **3 lbs* 56 lbs.
Su;*r»ho«phates of lime
To tel Production........... 1,381,600 ....... 3 *M)h ,500
Per Capita 16 1/2 lbs* 53 1/5 lbs
Quicksilver
tc ticn...........  3jC ...... 66*4
Per Capita *06 oz* *16 oz.
Cold
Total Production........... 15^ to 198....... 127 3/5
*023 oz. *032 oz.
Silver
Tota: iuctlon.............. 133 1/2 .... 2 ,0
...Per_Capl_te__________ _ ________— .— . ..— lA fi.-gjU — _— .— _ 2 Z 2 _2 S«—
■: .  .
sad., m e i n . UacSJillan, K.Y., 19.'
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fable n n .  Comparison of Mineral Production for Russia and the 0*S*
the Ob and Yenisei* £>urlng the navigation season ocean ships go 
as far as ffovi Port on the Ob and Igarka on the Yenisei* Goods 
can then be trans-shipped by river steaiser to Hova Slbirsk and 
Krasnoyarsk, the route continues through Vilkitski Strait between 
Severnoya Zm*lye and the rainland to the I^&pter Sea into which 
flows the Lena Elver where goods can be trans-shipped to Tiksi 
and taken nearly as far as Yakutsk by river* It goes on then 
through the Bering Sea to the Pacific*
Sea communication is being considered with Borth America*
Ships could go westward from Seattle throtigh the Bering. Sea to 
KoEsomolsk* The rost obvious economic significance of the Great 
northern Sea Route is the development in high latitudes of regions 
rich in natural resources not jet reached by railroad.
European ships, especially the British, engage in the lumber 
trade in the Kars Sea in n o m a l  tir.es* the Russians carry coal 
over this route from their wining concessions on Horwegian-owned 
Spitsbergen Islands to their far northern bases*
Soviet vessels have made the arduous roand-trip voyage from 
rurmamk or Archangel arcund north of Siberia to Petrojavlovsk 
or Vladivostok and back again in one season* It is cheaper to 
freight heavy loads to Vladivostok by the Arctic route than to 
send then over the Trans-Siberian Bailroad* Goods are brought 
also from Europe or Asia by sea and shipped to Inland Siberia via 
the rivers*
Scientific studies In ttv- Arctic.
The scientific study of the Arctic became the great national 
objective of the Soviet Union - conquest of Russia's foreign domain* 
Weather is "born" in the north and the Russians are studying
- 8 0 -
•Sl­
it there* During the war they were in a better position to fore­
cast weather in Japan than the Japanese were for weather travels 
eastward - that is, from Siberia towards Japan* Bussis1s position 
in the Arctic is really a powerful military weapon for no other 
country possesses the information concerning the sea or weather 
for waging war in this large and remote area* And only the 
Soviet authorities kno* the newly developed routes over both sea 
ana land in s&is area* Meteorological stations have been set up - 
in 1939 they totalled fifty one* Radio stations there are in 
constant communication with the mainland* In 193** & staff of 
five hundred scientists wintered there* Some stations are within 
five hundred sixty sriles cf the North Pole; others are within 
forty miles of United States territory* these stations work with 
the navigators on the Great northern Sea Route* Studies are also 
concentrated on developing techniques cf long distance flying*
In 1936 the first non-stop flight from Moscow to the Far 
East across the Arctic made the six thousand mile trip in fifty- 
six and one-half hours* The following year a plane flew across 
the North Pole fro& Moscow to the state of Washington - three 
thousand six hundred sixty five miles in sixty-three and one-half 
hours*
fevcloPE-ent cf Arctic tuid Sub-Arc U c  Siberia.
The geography and the resources of the Arctic are becoming 
a part cf Russia* The scientific conquest of the Arctic is as 
important to twentieth century Hussia as the Cossack conquest of 
Siberia ws-.s to seventeenth century Hussia* It is based on the 
Soviet syster of unified planning In uses of resources and 
energies* Along the coast there are now coaling stations?, oil
depots, food stores, and supplies - all to service sea and air 
transport* Ports have sprung up like Eiushrooi&s at mouths of 
Siberian rivers* It is expected that the full needs cf Arctic 
cocrerce will eventually be set by local deposits of ccal, oil, 
and other minerals*
&ich mineral stores are being found here around the Arctic, 
not only in Siberia but in other lands as well* Coal is being 
mined on the Spitsbergen Islands, iron in Sweden, gold in Alaska 
and cryolite in Greenland* Other minerals discovered north of 
the Arctic Circle are fluorspar, tin, nickel, zinc, graphite, 
rica, asbestos and copper*
The seas are rich in fish and seals* Agricultural experiments 
are even being carried on - the boundary line for agriculture is 
being pushed northward* Fodder and vegetables are growing in the 
long hours of Arctic sunshine*
Development of Resources 
Fully one half cf the industry in Tsarist Hussia was concen­
trated in the western section around Ivanov, Leningrad, Gorkin and 
Moscow. The Urals and the Ukraine produced about one third of 
the manufactures• To this industrial edge of the country, the 
huge land of agriculture and raw material to the east was subject* 
The hinterland of Hussia, & region of woodsren, peasants and 
notcads, was treated as a colony - a source of cheap labor and 
raw raterlals* Industry was not designed to satisfy the domestic 
markets $ it looked rather to the foreign markets of the east - 
Persia, Mongolia, and Manchuria* The peasants who were very poor 
and possessed of a low buying capacity satisfied their own needs 
by hoEie industry* It was the idess of Russia's "economic
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penetratlon* of the Orient that led In 190U to war with the 
Japanese who had the sane ambitions for their island industry*
I f  a country*s national p o licy , both domestic and foreign , 
is  to provide for the welfare and security of i t s  people, the 
Soviet government f e l l  heir to a state with in su ffic ien t access 
to the sea and with an internal economy unable to cope with the 
deficiency -  where both conditions precluded either welfare or 
security# Its  plan to overcore these conditions includes the 
creation of industrial areas from the Oral Mountains to the 
P acific Ocean in order to rake the country less  dependent on 
foreign sources for raw materials and manufactured goods, and 
le ss  dependent on Inadequate ports*
The new government acted on the assumption that Hussia was 
in danger o f being transformed into a colony o f the advanced 
industrial countries* Remembering the invasion o f i t s  country 
by foreign powers during the Revolution and C iv il War, i t  also  
aliped to make Russia impregnable to attack by one or store cap ital­
i s t  countries* To accomplish those alas Russia has had to 
"telescope the century long industrial revolution o f western 
countries into the span of one generation*«
Decentralization ofestablished.Industries.
The new Russia, then, set out to develop backward regions 
and people at the expense, if need be, of richer and more advanced 
centers* Industries were located as near as possible to sources 
of raw material and cheap power* I t  f e l t  that, though the 
in it ia l  program iright be c o stly , i t  wouia make a more rounded 
and less wasteful economy* Furthermore the location of industry 
was consciously planned to contribute to the defense of the
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country * the strong industrial centers were strategically 
located beyond reach of bombing or invasion* This progras of 
a planned economy Cl) reduced the cost of transportation of raw 
material fror sources of production to sanufacturing centers by 
rw&ueinf the distances between the two, (2) made industry more 
secure in tlase of war by decentralization, in that it let nature*• 
wide distribution of raw material determine the location of 
rtanufacturing establishments, and (3) shifted concentration of 
population from crowded western Europe to less densely settled 
Siberia*
fej:ploltattoi_,i>f ^ l n e r a l ,
Soviet geologists were sent out to comb the vast hinterland 
of western Hussia, that was all of Siberia and Turkestan, for 
mineral deposits, the extent to which they succeeded for coal 
alone is shown in Figures XVI and X?!I*
r ------wisS*****'-— —— — — .- ■. ■— .■ -- - -------
Coal Production— 1913 
Figure XVI.
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Coal Production— 193^. Figure XVII.
In 1913 coal production originated fro® nine areas* In 193**9 
in addition to increasing production In these areas, other ones 
had been exploited sc that total production soared# the wide 
diversity of the location of these deposits and their production 
are ehcvr* in Table IX.
Ifj&Lf IX.
Important Coal Deposit
Ifl.JlI.UPng, ..irif -J S tt-n r .
1# Don Basin*....................... jj%
(Ukrsnian S.S.R. and Azov-blaek Sea Hegion)
2# Moscow Basin............ ........... 1 *030
(Moscow province)
3# Oral..............*....... .............  109
(Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk Provinces)
km Pechora Basin*..........#••••♦..... .
(Northern region)
5* Transcauscaams••*•••••••••••#•••«••••
6# Central Asia*.......•••••«•••*••••*•• 157
7* Karagauda Basin.•••*•••**•**••#•*«••• — — —
(Kazak A*S*$*B.)
8* Kuznetsk Basin#* • • • • • • . . . . . . . . .  13,000
(West Siberian Rgfion)
9* Minusinsk Basin*.................. 160
(Krasnoyarsk Hegion)
10* Kansk Basin****..**......*.......... .
m m
71,088
5,930
5,038
60,000
bt. . 1 )
5,263
19,999
W OO , 0 0 0  
1W.0C5
«*o,ooo
!!♦ Irkutsk‘ Basin. . .. ~ ~' '’Y ^ O O O ^  ^'?ffSU8
(East Siberian Region)
1 2 . fungus Basin................ •••••• . **00,000
(Kra sue yors k Reg1on)
13. Burelnsk Basin........... *...... . — — * 60,000
(Far Eastern Territory)
1**. Ti-kutla..............«••..»••••.. — —  60t00C
15* Maritime Province................ ^ ..............JLJ21____
(Far Eastern Hegion)
__________ ______ _______ ____y .....32QJ16 Xm.Z2SUU5,.___
(N. Iikhaylov - Soviet ueog.) 
Aside frrr the Don B&sin, oscow and tne Orals, tt*e major coal 
producing aretis are located in Asia, with Kusnetsk and Krasnoyarsk 
areas dominating* Estimate© of coal reserves in these two areas 
©lore ar<* said tc be sufficient to supply the needs of the world 
for three hundred years.
Of the newly opened iron ore fields the most important by 
far ere those of the Orals, eep— telly Magnet I w i t l i n  and the 
ragnotic « res of Kursk. /eong the &ore imzrrt&nt discoveries 
of non-ferrous minerals fere copper beds around Lake Balkash, 
Kazakhstan, and Central Asia. The Orals and the Kola peninsula 
Heve knot* deposits of wfetMll§ apatite, and nephellne. the Orals 
and Kazakhstan have chroB&usi, potassium salts, aclybdenur., vana­
dium, wolfrai,, tin, antimony, mercury, sulphur and radiur.. %‘ith 
the exception of tun? 3ten all the rinerals such as sran^anese, 
ehr , 7 olybdenufe anti era required fcr spee lal steels are 
present In abundance. Table 1  s>f*ows the reserves of power a 
minerals r Hussia as compared with total world reserves.
lafela. i* .
TJ.S.S.R. Reserves © r Power and minerals as 
compared wit sorld Reserves
SftbiiL. IX. .Coiis.
Iron wi th quarts. «•••••.......... ..... ...........5< *u percent
Oil.............................................. ...32.1 *
Istis- ju-fcaat
"
19.0 " 
73 A
8 3 .0  *
62.0 " 
72.7 
1 1 . 0  •’
9.0  •
H  * 0 percent
aetojraggxauLM. 15a 2
In 1920 it was decided that electricity should be the busts 
for changing Hussia from an "incredibly backward country* to a 
modern highly industrialized state* the power stations are based 
upon the nearest source of fuel or water power derived from 
harnessing the power of such rivers as the One!per ard Volga*
Tliis devetopi&ent of local power contributed to the wide dispersal 
of Industry* As a. result of this program Russia•» position in 
the development of capacity of electric stations rose from five 
percent of world total in 1913 to forty percent in 1939.
Oil reserves are sore extensive than those of the United 
States* The areas of production are concentrated in the Caucasus 
region with the section between the Volga and Urals to the Cau­
casus constituting a * second t>aku% Estimates credit the region 
east of the Orals **1 th eighty percent of the energy resource# of 
the Soviet Onion, eighty seven to ninety percent of the copper, 
ninety-five percent cf zinc, twenty-eight to forty percent of 
the iron cref ninety-8ix percent of the rare metals, seventy two 
percent of the yearly growth of forests, and sixty percent of 
the wheat* The refion between the Urals and Lake Baikal is 
destined to beeore the industrial backb ne of Hussia*
In 191^ only fourteen rsf the ninety-two chemical elements
were known to be available in Hussia* Today eighty are found and 
used*
Develoslng a b-lanced ecoaonar by stressing irad-jstry as well  ta 
agriculture.
The land potentially suitable for agriculture is upwards of 
thirty-seven million four hundred thousand acres*of which one 
eighth is already tinder cultivation* Every type of cereal, 
vegetable an I fruit land (except tropical) is present* Tsarist 
Hussia was a predominantly agricultural country, though deplorably
backward, and dependent on foreign countries for manufactured
/
goods* Early in the transformation of Russia, plans called for 
farming on an extensive scale and for the mechanisation of the 
farm* Small sc&lo peasant agriculture was replaced by large scale 
mechanised farring employing scientific agricultural methods*
The plains topography fitted in admirably with this plan* The 
prograc included developrent of agriculture in dry areas by the 
construction of Irrigation projects on a large scale, and agri­
cultural experiments in northern Siberia in regions, heretofore, 
considered unfit for farming* By 1939, forty percent of the 
nation’s human resources were engaged in industry and sixty per­
cent in agriculture*
Development of *ajor Ir.JuatrUl sreaa.
In her plans for reducing the industrial and agricultural 
lag in the country three needs were recognised (1) the economic—  
factories should be built close to the raw material producing 
are#s, (2) the polltlcal— tr&nsfonr. the backward people including
* Wm acreago of fan?: land in Illinois is thirty one million eight 
hundred seventy five thousand, of which ninety percent is In
cultivation*
those in vast Siberia Into loyal i M  skilled citizen s (3) the 
military-— loeata relatively s e lf -s u ff ic ie n t  industrial areas well
a*my trim western frontiers* A by-product of this ambitious 
prc-graR t?£s the development of Siberia c*n a grand scale and a 
desirable general eastward movement* The extent of her success • 
became evident during the years of the lest war* When the region 
reaching fror a line west of Leningrad, I’oscow, and Stalingrad, 
embracing the Ukraine and the rich producing areas of south 
Bussls, fell to Germany, she was able to continue the war on the 
basis of her industrial strength in the Urals and Siberia*
In  deliberate contrast to the Tsarist policy, the Soviet 
Union Industrialised not only European territories but even core 
speedily its Asiatic lands as well. ?er expansion eastward to 
the Pacific has its parallel in our own expansion westward to 
the Pacific. In this program of Industrialisation there are 
eight rajor areas, six of which are shown in Figure XVIII*
Figure XVIII.
(1) The Ural industrial area— The rap, Figure XIX, shows 
Hussia4s industrial strength in the Urals region* There is a
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particularly hsavy concentration of the metallurgical industries 
east of the Urals based on the mineral deposits of these mountains 
Thm industries are basod on an area larger than thfct of Hew York 
ana Pennsylvania which it resembles* Magnitogorsk is "the 
Pittsburgh of the East’1* Mew industries and t o w n  are springing 
up based on the manufacture of iron ana steel, copper, aluffiinutt 
andi nickel* Heavy machinery, machine tools, locomotives, tractors 
Diesel engines and aero-engines are built in these centers de* 
riving their raw steel from this region* Ihe local coal, potass­
ium stilts, sulphur and pyrites are m e  basis of chemical combines 
ip* 92) &t Sokilkau.sk* The region provides its own energy and 
has a surplus*
(2) Moscow and Leningrad region - The former is the center 
of a vast textile industry as well as aetallurfical (largely 
aluniinuai) and chemical industries (Figure XVIII). About twenty- 
eight percent of the total production of Russi a is centered in 
tnis region. It accounts for twenty percent of the he&vy industry 
and ninety percent of the textiles* The forcer includes the 
manufacture cf machine tools and industries related to trans­
portation. It was planned that, should south and west Russia 
fall to an invader, Moscow would be able to supply railroads and 
equipment to the districts of the east* 'Zeroslav on the upper 
Volga is the hoise of rubber and asbestos Industries* It is the 
largest combination of plants of this type in the world*
(3) the Ukraine and its margins *• In this region, Figure 
XIX, heavy ^metallurgical Industries are based on the iron ore of 
Krivci Hog and the coal of the Donets Basin* Oil is also brought 
here by pipe line from the Caucasus* this region supplies
dynamos and other technical appliances for all basic industries 
of the Soviet - the metallurgies!, the lining and oil* It also 
produces 4rectors, turbo-gencrators and iraehlne tools. The 
Ukraine Is a versatile area, productively speaking. It ranks 
high as shown in Table X, in the Mineral productst coal, iron 
ere, N S f M t W I  and aluminum; in products* pig iron,
rolled Ketal, agricultural jsachlneryi end in fans productst sugar, 
I ram t ?£ sur.f 1 r v er see d f ve^e f ■. b le rils)*
Ukranien Production In Percent of Total U*S*S*B. Production (19**0)
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T c T c F e r c ^ t T w ^ r ' 77.3*+. 9
61.6 lur inur:.•••*••••• ...72.1
63-0 it * Machine I Gilding....,20.0
*♦7.8 it Organic dyes•••.•• *»*33*0
68.0 *t
Grain**«•«*••*..•* 22.7 •' (1938)
kgrici Itural Sunflower seed•. •. ...20*0
...... j m - t» sasBssEssaEssyc,ff .v . ^ ? a K ^ i n ^ n - ! ? i m ^ T :  i t t ? ,
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(U) The Caucasus region - This is the oil producing area* 
Of a total national production of thirty two million tons in 
1938, Baku on the Caspian produced twenty-fovv million tons, 
ialkop and Grozny a b u t  five million*
(55 K u z m t z  coal basin - the Kuznets Basin in the Kagakh 
republic, Figure XX, is the center of iron manufacturing* The 
development of the combine is a basis of Industry here* A 
corhine is a 1 rge unit of Soviet enterprise including a number 
of industrial works* In the Oral-Kusnetz combine there are two 
regions, e&ch rich in its own rinerals &nd ever one thousand 
tciles apart, worked as one gre&t enterprise for production of 
iron and steel + the south Ural Magnet lountain with iron ore 
only a little below the surf ce and the coal of the K u m e t z
Figure XX.
Basic to the eaat*.**he two materials are intercimngod by trucks 
on a specially construetad railway going one way loaded with 
iron ora and the other loaded with coal* There are iron and 
steal works at both termini* Haw rrdnes, new foundries and 
various subsidiary undertakings are brought into the combine* 
Magnitogorsk is at one end and Stallnsk at the other* Wew coal 
fields are being developed at Karaganda to feed the Urals region* 
Ihe former is the s.ost southerly of the mining area but minerals 
are found northward on up to the Arctic Circle* the hills end 
valleys are dotted with new towns - the whol^ range is rich in 
copper as well as iron.
(6) Soviet Central Asia - woolen and silk industries are 
being developed fro® local supplies. Metal industries are also 
being developed* Sovo£ibiriskf center of an agricultural and 
new industrial areaf is the * Chicago'* of Siberia*
. (7) lorthwest Karelia and its margins - this area Is the 
objective of hundreds cf geological and engineering expeditions. 
There is industrial activity In Highly specialised fields. Apatite 
deposits useful in industry as phosphate are the world’s largest. 
Iron ore r^aerv -s ar<> estimated at one and a half billion tons. 
Deposits of copper, nickel, wlce, granite, limestone, clays, 
rr . fir?£ slate, titanic, and vt ni ditBs have been located in this 
area for which Murmansk will be the natural port*
(S) Far Eastern region - The coal of the Burel Valley and 
the iron ere of the Little Xlnghan Mountains are being exploited 
and used as the basis of metallurgical works* Upon these, depends 
tutorials for machine building, railroad construction and ship
building of the Far Fast*\
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Russia’s Efforts to Improve her Position with Reference to Sea
Forts Through International Moves.
From the days of Peter the Great to the post war days of
Vorld War XI the persistent theme in Russian foreign policy has
been its pressure for an utlet to the sea~~a constant effort to
conquer the natural disadvantages of an inland situation* The
direction of these pressures north, south, east and west is shown
in Figure XXI*.
CriAPTSS VII
c~
She holds that she has "only a few thin threads that connect her 
with the sea* They have a tendency to break whenever she is in 
trouble*” Exerting the weight of her position as the greatest 
power on continental Europe today, she is endeavoring to gain by 
International moves what she has failed to gain by arsis*
•96*
Control o f the Black Sea S traits  
The Black Sea is  Russia*s life line— the bulk cf her exports 
reach international trade channels through this cutlet* In i?29  
she gained access to the Black Sea and since that day much of her 
diplomacy has been directed towards control of i t s  outlet* to a 
non-Russian the S traits are an ou tlet fro® the Black Sea to the 
Mediterranean but to a Russian they are an entry into the Blaek 
Sea frois the Mediterranean* Since she has Included Rumania and 
Bulgaria within her sphere of influence she now controls the 
greater part of the shores of the Black Sea; Turkey the other 
power on i t s  l i t t o r a l  has the lesser part* She is now in  a 
position to demand o f Turkey bases which w ill control the Straits*  
Control o f the Straits w ill give Russia contact with the 
Mediterranean Sea routes which lead d irectly  into international 
a ffa irs  and also make possible extension of influence in the 
Middle Bast* Centuries o f  experience have taught the truth in  
the adage, "He who controls the'Hediterranean commands Europe** 
Through Bulgaria, Russia is  also able to exert pressure on the 
north o f Greece for the control of the port o f Salonika* The 
position of Greece (and England) was recently strengthened in 
the AF.gean Sea when It was awarded the Ita lian  Dodecanese Islands* 
In World War I a secret agreement with France and Gerr-any 
would ha we given Hussia control of both sides of the S tr a its , 
including Constantinople, but the Russian Revolution and the 
Cofsminist renunciation of Tsarist claims saved the A llie s  from 
having to f u l f i l l  the cos&lttsrent* After that war the Straits  
were dem ilitarised and declared open to free navigation, but In 
1936 the Montreux Convention permitted rer11itari*a t i on and gave
Turkey virtual control of the Straits# Except when Turkey is at 
war, merchant ships and even small warships may pass through but 
submarines are excluded. In war, if turkey is neutral, the 
Strait Is to be closed to warships of belligerents except those 
acting under authority of the League of Nations. If Turkey is 
at war, she is in complete control and may close the Straits if 
she considers herself threatened. When she did this in 19*+1, she 
bottled up the Kusslan Navy in the sea. Thus Turkey, a s&ail 
land power, was able to restrict a far greater land power. One 
of Hussia*s "thin threads” had broken again.
Turkey has announced she will resist all efforts to lessen 
her control. In November, 19^5, Secretary of State, Byrnes, 
suggested that the Straits be open to merchant vessels of all 
nations at all times and to warships of Black Sea powers (Bussia, 
Rumania, Bulgaria and Turkey) at all times and to warships of 
other nations only under authority of the United nations. Ho 
agreement was reached at that time.
Hussia Is also now in a position to fight a "battle of 
nerves” in the entire area. Her derands for trusteeships of 
the Italian colony of Eritrea is a bid for a position on the 
Bed Sea, and that of Tripolitania is her bid for a direct part 
in Mediterranean affairs. Encouraging the aspirations of the 
Arab League in Middle-Eastern countries puts a strain on Anglo- 
Bussian relations for it is a challenge to British Interest and 
prestige in this area.
Internationalizing Waterways.
When Bessarabia was ceded by Rumania to Bussia, she gained 
direct access to the Danube River. This river has for a long
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time been internationalized, but Russia’s control of Danube 
affairs through her satellite countries aloa its course does not 
make its internationalisation so Important to Bussia of today*
The United States has proposed a clause for all the Balkan 
treaties* "Navigation of the Danube*..*shall be free end open 
on terrs of entire equality to nationals, vessels of commerce 
and goods of all states**1 Russia has displayed a negative 
attitude toward it*
The situation with the Kiel Canal Is different* Since she 
does not have unrestricted dor1nance cf the Baltic or Horth Seas, 
she wants to see the canal put under International control*
Through Jugoslavia and her satellite Albania, she has 
control of the Adriatic* The Big Four have decided (still sub­
ject to ratification by the Peace Conference) to award tfenesia 
Guiglia to Yugoslavia and to internationalize the port of Trieste 
arid Its environs under United Rations tutelage.2
In the Far East by a recent treaty with China she has se­
cured joint ownership of the Manchurian Railroad and a joint 
lease for thirty years of the naval base of Port Arthur* Daten
cu
n*s been declared free port* Shm is also insisting upon the 
internationalization of the Korean Strait*
Surrounding herself with ufriendly governments*, fastern 
Surope, from Finland, and the Elbe Elver to the borders of Greece, 
is In the undisputed sphere cf Russian power* Hussia has en­
circled herself with three sones• -■
I* "alime. July ?9, 19^61 Page 20* 
a* Tire, Aug* 5, 19**6*
3* Dulles, vohn Foster, Life, August 3, 19^6*
-9 8 -
Xhe first, the Inner Zone, includes the Union itself with the 
region north of Finland and strategic areas in south Finland that 
control access to the Baltic, the States of Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, northern port of East Prussia, eastern one-half of 
Poland, eastern part of Czechoslovakia (Ccrpatho-Ukraine) 
Bessarabia and Bukovina (formerly Buaaaniaii) Xannu~lava, fort 
/rthur, the southern one-half of Sakhalin and the Kuril© Islands* 
When fmd if Kars and Erzurum are obtained from turkey, they will 
beccre a part of this Zone. The second is the Middle Zone. It 
is made up of friendly governments or Russian occupied areas, 
those whose governments Russia can control. It Includes Poland, 
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, £&st Austria, Hungary, Rumania, 
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Sinkiang, 4*oicnuria, nor tin Korea 
and cuter Mongolia. Russia seeks to complete this Zone with 
the addition of Greece, Iran (Azerbaijan), turkey, Kurdistan 
and Korea. The third, the Outer Zone, is the rest of the world. 
Russia has access to it through the Baltic Sea, a port on the 
Korth See at the mouth of the Elbe River, the Adriatic, irajor 
frontage on the Black Sea, its Arctic Coast, and ports In the 
Far East, particularly on the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan.
The Xelta agreement awarded southern Sakhalin and the &urile 
Islands to Russia. This puts the Sea of Okhotsk under Russian 
influence although the rigors of cliiiiate at this latitude still 
limit its use. The Kurile Islands, a chain of about thirty-two 
Islands stretelling along a distanceAseven hundred miles, has 
little economic value. £he islands along with Sakhalin, Port 
Arthur, and the Maval base at Fetropavlovekon Kamchatka Penin­
sula (the second of two open ports Russia possesses) will form a
-9 9 -
defensive ring guarding her entire Far Eastern frontier.
Fro® Finland Hussia is to gat another warm water port, 
Petsajro, and the province of the saire nar:>e in the north#
Peter the Great, "the Father of the Russian Navy**, once 
said, "the future of Hussia lies at the Kouth of the Don, Heva, 
and Amur*1, With the defeat of Germany, Russia is no^ in a 
position to assume control of the Baltic, into which the Neva 
pours its waters* Since 1917 the Baltic Sea has been filled 
with the mercantile flags of the small states while Russia, save 
for her port of Leningrad, felt herself cooped in behind the 
new littoral states. Leningrad was ninety miles away fro®
Estonia and twenty*three miles fro® Finland* Its position right 
be compared to that cf cur Mew tork City, if Long Island were 
foreign controlled and accessible by land to our avowed enemy* 
Though Russia today has no rival on the Baltic, its outlet 
three irdles wide and crossed in fifteen minutes, is controlled 
still by &ogland through the Scandinavian countries* Hussia£s 
acquisition of Xoenigsberg (fro® East Prussia) will give central 
Hussia direct access to the sea* Her position is further enhanced 
by Poland * s claims to a seacoast that includes Stettin. Finland 
is to demilitarize the Aaland Islands and give Hussia a lease of 
the Baltic naval base at Parkola* inis will put her in control 
of the north of the baltic* The internationalisation of the 
Kiel canal will further break down foreign domination of the sea* 
I'hiis the defeat of German expansion plans on the west and 
Japanese plans for domination of the east are freeing Hussia frotr 
her isolation of the past*
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CHAPTER VIII
Hussia1s Abilities Both Present and Potential to Carry 
Out Her Ambitious Plans*
the struffle to overcome her geographical Isolation and. the 
handicap of frog* siae without compensatory ocean contacts Is the 
motive thet explains so mity of Bussl&'s deirands upon states that 
stand between her and the sea* However, Russia has not depended 
upon diplomacy and pressure alone. She has planned for herself 
an ambitious program of Internal development, that will either 
make ocean contacts less; necessary in sore Instances, and make 
pore possible maximum returns fror handicapped contacts in other 
cases. This program calls for an extensive syster, of transporta­
tion and communication that will bring far-away ports nearer to 
the core, the exploitation of all resources, anft industrial 
expansion that will make her less dependent on foreign sources 
for m w  materials, manufactured goods, markets or capital, an 
agricultural program that will take care of food and raw material 
needs of a balanced economy* a liftinr of the general standard 
of living, and an increase in literacy of a people where ill­
iteracy wes the rule* Incidentally, the attainment of these 
goods will make her so strong internally that her voice will 
carry rruch weight in international affairs when she places her 
demands for ports, positions or seas upon the council table*
Hussia*s shinties to carry out her plans must be examined 
in the light of what has been accomplished since 191^ or so, the 
days of the Tsar,, or slo.ee 19^0 when her fortunes were at their 
lowest ebb* After her collapse in *-!crld ’”ar 1 and the chaos of 
Bevolution and Civil War that followed, Russia's existence as an
in1*pen:lont atate vr.r threatened* the progress rA* sat up in 
various ?ive Ifear Plans.* The Herman 7ns titute for ^eonawic 
research found that th>" $•$•£•£• c ^ r r ^ m M y  incr^-vsed its share 
in 7*0 rid industrial production frr^ **•? percent in 19?9, to 
11#5 percent in 19?- £nd 12 percent In 1939* -'is places It third 
in ran?, among the M r  indus*rUl countries aft*r the United 
states ani Greater Herr any.1 Fussi&'s industrial tntfex cf one 
hundred in 1*13 rose to 9C3.° by 193*. ? s M e  -TT lists total 
production cf ra^ materials and focda in the tT#£*S»ft» in 193^§ 
its percent in ^crl* trad# a M  its rank a^ong rrodueers* tts 
rank whether it is rinerfcts, fibers, vegetables, oils, or food* 
stuffr, is u®lfoo*rly high* Arons minerals in thr.t year, it ves 
either first or seeorv* in oil, iron cr«, *manfarese mn* phosphates* 
in textiles fibers, it wns first In flax end her?} in vegetable 
oils, It was second in linseed oil; in foodstuffs, • t was first 
in barley, oats, rye, sugar beets, and wheat*
Production of 1913 to 1^39*
/. study cf Iflgnre XXTT will sho*? the increase in or©duetic® 
of ten iters ever a g arter cf a cert >ry* In 1913 the production 
of pig iron was 2&J percent cf the 1<*3? production? tt* production 
of steel was 23*6- percent ef that, of 193®* machine build in, i ro- 
duet!on --%$ only four pe~ce^t of *hst cf 1937* The greatest pro­
gress was probably ssade in machine tractor stations ef which 
there -ere non? In 1913? in 1930 their number was only 2»k percent 
cf W i l  of 193t* Itti m l  consumer goods In 192&, when
Hussia was concentrating on capital productive goods cf agri­
culture , in-1 us try and transportation, had not risen over 1913
T. C«org« !Ci«*«r - fhr la Bu»ai» So Strong? CH*ss«r»l Switz}£l«ad,
P. 105.
Xrr.
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Product____________________ M9%iXs..Is>as___ ifoElflJtefcal Prp-fassra
Mineral
Petroleum (1939)**•*♦*** 29*530.000 10*6 2nd*
Co&l *»•»•«.*........... * 132,380,000 10.9 **th.
♦Iron Or© (metal content) I1* ,600,000 19*5 1st**
Bauxite (crude ora)**.** 250,COO 6*1 3th*
Chrome or© (asetal content 90 f000 17*3 3rd* 
-1937-
Copper (metfel content).* 93,000 M-*8 6th*
Gold.................. **. .... —  12.5 eat* 3rd.
Lead ore (metal content) 69,000 3*9 oth.
Manganese (metal content) 1,050,000 **1.3 1st*
Mercury (quicksilver, 193^) 268,000 5*2 est. 5th*
Nickel (met&l content)** 2,500 2*3 3rd*
♦♦Zinc ore (metal content) 70,000 3*7 7th***
Asbestos (193&)** •***••* 125,0^0 —
Phosphates (mineral).*** 2,303,000 15*6 2nd* 
Potash (in terms of % 0  content.* *
122,000 *f.l *fth.
Textile fibers
Cotton ginned (1939)*•*•* 8S0,000 *3*5 3rd*
Flax (1939)***...•*.*•*** 633,000. * 68*0 1st*
Hemp (fiber) (1939).*..*. 110,000 29*3 1st*
Silk (r&jr).*............. . 1,300 3*2
wool.................. . 137,000 7*6 5th*
Vegetable oil seeds and nuts
Cottonseed (1939)**.«•«•• 1,900,000 1^*5 3rd*
Linseed...... 750,000 23*1 2nd*
Sesamum <1935-36).*......  9,000 l.U est. 8th*
Soya bean (19375**...... 100,000 est. 1*^ 3 est. 6th.
Foodstuffs
Barley...**...............  S, 19*2 1st.
BUtter ***.***••••«..**«** 1 9 8 , 0 0 0  ™ *
***Mai*e......*********.....  2,690,000 2*3 6th.***
Meat............... *......  3 *303 f000
Oats*.....................  16,990,000 25*2 1st*
Rice (rough)**•••«....... 317,000 0.3 19th*
Rye (1939).*..•••***.*'•.. 20,93^,000 V3.U 1st*
Sugar beets (1939)*•***•• 2 ,**00,000 23*0 1st*
•***T#*........................ 11,000 1.8 ' 7 th.****
\lheat....... **............ M>,880,000 25*0 1st.
tobacco (1936)*.*...........  276,000 11.9 3rd*
1 M  1
^bracketed with t7.S* ***br&cketed with Hungary
Hteca-S£e$ed ***& i&lftPj*------------r .* -------(Bulletin of Internstloral *ews, 
July 12, 19^1.)
Production in Percent of Rank among
levels* It -as only 25 percent of 1937 production. Construction 
p l a n t s  h a d  r i s e n  f r o m  nine p e r c e n t  i n  1 9 1 3  t o  1 ^ . 5  p e r c e n t  i n
* *
The following table compares 1913 and 1939 production for 
six major ifceae by expressing percentages In terms of world 
productioni
1913 1939 
percent
1. ou..»................................ . 5 io
2. Electric Station Capacity.... 5 Vo
3. Grains......................... 15 25
h. Sugar beets...................  10 2 0
5* Flax......................... . 30 55
6. Cotton....................... 5 10
Comparison of production of principal minerals in the United
States and Russia is shown in Tab! VIII. In only a very few
instances does per capita production in Russia exceed that of
the United States. It is true of nickel, asbestos, and mafnesite.
However, when one compares the production of Russia in one period
with that of another period as was done in Figure XXII one can
see her industrial growth. In cosiparin- Bussian production with
that of the United States, one rust take into account the fact
that the Industrial Revolution care to the latter country over a
century ago#
Population Increase and Distribution 
Population in Russia has not only increased but it has 
shifted both to the east and to the city* the table below shows 
how the population for four cities has grown since 1926.
- 1 0 * + -
1928 of 1937 levels#
-----------------------------122L.------- ---- 1 &J2 ____ fcSE^mL_<>LJte3E$Sfl£.
M o s c o w 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 V,137,0 0 0 over IOC f 
Leningrad 1,600,000 3*191*000 over 99 %
Kharkov *fl7,000 833,000 100 $
se&L_________ ___ _ __ issasaa_____ — -g*.oop--.......over __________
Today about twenty-five percent of its people live in cities 
of ten thousand or more as coisp&red with forty-seven percerit in
*■
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M37 «*- 44.7 CrtfMHUlS. t U f  „ **,. if>
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l*»5 7  p * - + 4 ~ u * - t m n  (  l o o )
Production of 1913--1928— 1937 Compared. 
Figure XXII.
G. Goodall, Soviet Russia 
in Maps.
the Waited States* In 19*fO the center of population was U6° E* 
Longitude (est compared with 3^° Longitude a cent ry earlier) 
and the territorial center is at ^5^” *
Russian population reached & low figure of 131,000,000 in 
1930 but since that tisre the annual Increase has averaged over 
three million* In 19**0 Russia had nine percent of the world’s 
population* Its people ere also the world’s youngests--more 
than one half of thee are under twenty-five* In this respect 
they reser-.ble the United Staten of fifty years ago or earlier,
▼hen the vast west was conquered by a young energetic people*
Its youth is also due, as in early Africa, to hardships that 
reduced life expectancy of the older reople in previous ye&rs*
It is due, even more though, to a high birth rate combined with 
a falling death rate*
Increase in Literacy 
In education the Soviet has rade progress that is in keeping 
with that of other fields* The literacy rate has been increased 
from 26 percent in 1913 to 81 percent in 19^). Compulsory 
education bec&ise a rational policy only a short while before 
World War I, fifty years later than it did in England* The Soviet 
government then had to build an education system alisost frosu 
the beginning and had to contend with an adult population that
was largely illiterate* The success with which they jret the
i
situation is one of the ma^or achievements* leaders in Russia 
have placed mm hasis upon the importance ef a literate people 
as essential to the success of a socialist state* A vital part 
of education in Russia is the Indoctrination of coismunist idealogy* 
Ho doubt Hussia*s success in changing the face of the land since
1920 Is due In no nm.ll part to the changing of the literacy  
le v e l, and to the special emphasis on technical training* 
technical and Scientific Progress
Moscow centralises the scientific knowledge of the Onion 
through its many institutes and cojE&issions on world resources, 
economics, sss&theratics, soil chemistry, geology, oceanography, 
teterology, agriculture, the stratosphere and other subjects* 
Technical and professional schools increased their number of one 
hundred a m  their enrolIk ent of 150,000 in 1916 to seven hundred 
twenty one schools with an enrollment of one half million In 
1S31** Secondary technical schools of which there were none in 
1916 numbered 3,522 in 193** with an enrollment of three fourths 
of & Billion*5.*
the accomplishments of Russian geologists and aeteerologists  
have already been discussed in  connection with Hussia1a develop­
ment of her natural resource# and her conquest f the Arctic*
At first Russia used British, American and German t* chnicians to 
develop M r  resources and train her workmen until she had 
technicians cf her c m *  Bince than, the technical competence 
cf the Hussians has developed with the wholesale introduction of  
re chani »ati on*
the chemical Indus try is an excellent example of hussian 
progress in technology .no. science. It is largely a creation of 
Post-Bevolution days, covering manufacture of cnesdeal products 
from tisiber, synthetic fibers, synthetic rubber, pl&stics, 
fertilizers Hindus trii.1 chemicals a?rd explosives, typical new 
enterprises are tu-c scaniafact^re cf fertilisers fro® the apatite
Yaroslav*
Great strides were mad# in the improvements of agriculture 
through the scientific study of plants* seeds * end land isn rove- 
sent as well as soil ehe«i*try. T"rrntH science they have ex* 
tended the northern liult of agriculture over that of 1913* the? 
have adapted plants to suit unusual soil anil climate conditions 
and introduced new varieties cf plants*
Cohesion of her People in the Multi-national State
1th its finorities
In Judging Btisslafs present ani potential ability to carry 
out her plans, the political factor is as important as the 
geographical or eeonorie. In a country where there are two 
hundred million peoplet one hundred distinc* nationalities! and 
one hundred twenty-five different languages? any political ergen- 
i sat ion that unites theas can hardly be it nation— rather it is 
a mnll league cf nations* {tussle is t** largest soviet socialist 
republic mmom the sixteen, Figure XX, but nresn^atoly it does not 
Borinate, for the sixteen republics have equal rights and repre­
sentation In the Soviet of nationalities which corresponds to 
our equality of large »n-* snail 1 states in our Senate. Ilor does 
the word Russia appear in the official tmme of the confederate 
state— Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* the Soviet of 
Nationalities is the Second Che»bert and forms with the Soviet 
of the Union, the First Chewber, the Bnvrmm Soviet of the tJnioa 
cf the 0*8*®*ft* which litre our Congress is the highest organisation 
of the state power* tike our House of Representatives the Soviet 
of th^ “Inion is elected aec^rdin^ to population* one deputy being 
chosen for each area of three hundred thousand oeople*
Under the tsarist goverueent inequality between the Buss Ians
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and other n ation alities -was deliberately fogtered, and suppression 
of the la t t e r ?s language and cultures was normal# In World 'ar 
I Russia with a l l  i t s  suppressed siinorities was the first nation 
to crack under the strain . The Soviet has reversed that policy  
and substituted f - r i t  one o f  enlightenment and culturef a 
p o l i c y  that fosters cultural in d ivid u al!ty o f  a l l  i t s  people*1 
Booksj newspapers and reviews are printed fcr f o r t y  differen t  
peoples who were without an alphabet of their own before 1920* 
Hussia points with pride to the fact that in World "Mr II  
the Germans found not quislings but gu erillas upon their invasion 
o f the Soviet* She has b u ilt up a powerful unity with her theory 
of racial equality in  contrast to trie German theory of 1 aster 
and inferior races. Through i t s  recognition of divers national­
it ie s  end p o l ic y  of f a i r  rep re se n ta tio n  to the® Bussia has been 
a b le  to e n lis t  the e ffo rts  cf a l l  those people under her ju r is ­
d iction .
-109*
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London, 19*+2» P. 27*
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CHAPTER IX 
Sea Ports and National Prestige
In her use of present Inadequate sea ports and in her 
pressure for more access to the sea, Bussia feels her national 
prestige is Involved* With a nation, as with an individual, 
there is a certain sensitiveness to a publicly known weakness 
or deficiency, and one is always on the defensive where It is 
involved. Hussia is in this position as far as her lack of sea 
ports is concerned*
She observes that her use of the Baltic is restricted, not 
alone by geography, but by powerful nations whose strength on 
the sea is a challenge to her. The restrictions of the Black 
Sea are due not entirely to a physical condition— *a small country 
controls Its outlet and the Great Power behind it is confined*
In the Far East a similar situation is true. An island people 
of seventy million is able to control the seas that the Russians 
would use. In the north though, the opponent ia clinate* the ally 
Is science* It Is in this area that Bussia is bending every 
resource to gain peacefully what the peoples to the south are 
denying her.
The United States could incorporate Mexico and Cfpc^da within 
its bounds— we would probably have the military strength to accom­
plish it* However, it does not folio® that we will* let, if 
anyone should attempt to make this impossible, we would be com­
pelled to sieve in. The situation is much the same with Hussia*
«
though she night be &ble to secure an outlet through the 
Dardanelles or Iran through an^ed pressure, it does not follow 
that she will* However, the policy of other nations to make it
impossible' for her to do so, such as British support of Turkey, 
Iran, or the Seandanevlan countries, is art affront* She becomes 
sensitive to the iroplleation that another aountry Is superior 
end can dictate what she shall or shell not do with respect to 
these particular outlets to the sea*
Hussia Urergod from ^orld War II Victorious.
Whan Gerrany f r m r d  the war eastward, she be re the runt of 
?asl military fright an6 turned vhat right have been disaster Into 
victory. Her position new Is different fror. that of the first 
World ?var when she emerged frrsi the chats "politically ostracised* 
among nations* Her people can no longer be looked upon as second 
class citlaens* By their sacrifices they have acquired a new 
stature* An-* Bussia through her foreign policy, speaks for two 
hundred rillion of them*
She feels that a land-minded nation of her area, population 
and resources need not he subject to the dominance or threat of 
superior sea power* If the dynamism of her Internal economy 
requires access to the sea find trade routes, she reason? that no 
nation or combination of nations should hold then from her* for 
centuries she "nas suffered a sort of claustrcrhebia* because of 
her geographic location* 8he has nevei been able to swing her 
full weight in the world for she has been cut off from contact 
with international channels* How irorc than aver before, she is 
conscious of the full power of her weight* Russia, the multi­
national state has the cohesion and unity that makes her act as 
one rather than as a country burdened with internal dissension* 
this has co.me under communism* For the first time a measure of 
economic derooracy has come to the Basses through the development
of resources* transportation and education* She feels that her 
lack of seeportst a geographical and historical fact that Is 
rezr*dlai::lef rust not hamper her program*
The Worl<5 JSust Be One 
Coss&unlsa hag passed the experimental stagey that vat 
demonstrated when Hussia withstced the sight of German armament* 
Its philosophy and pro gram are now centered, not on *?orld re­
volution, bat on bui Idling socialise in on® country, in bringing 
the fruits of devolution to Russia itself* This cannot be 
accomplished by autarchy >r isolation* Progress can be acceler­
ated by closer ec&serelal ties with advanced industrial countries* 
And in their own country wan expanding internal market, a rising 
standard of living and a ‘rising rate of production are great 
stimulants to trade %  Stalin says that Russia wants trade '"to 
ceaent friendly relations with other countries and actually pro- 
note u policy of peace%
i'oday we are coning upon an air age. There is no spot on 
earth that cannot be reached within sixty hours— in other word»f 
in whatever country fe »ay live, our J^ost distant neighbor is no 
aore than sixty hours air travel away* It behooves us then to 
understand these neighbors* It is no longer possible for a 
nation, whether it be the United States or Puss.la, to withdraw 
into itself ,.ri live apart for there are no longer sratiat 
distances that separate us* iussla during her 1 one years of 
Isolation has called herself a "consorts tie island” surrounded 
by “capitalistic seas**
During those years ef isel U e i  wlrnittienteii has grown* 
fhe peoples cT the "earlt.sl istic waters'* do r\**t understand those
of the *coiss;t*Eistlc island* and the people cf the *isls-J3d*? do 
net understand those cuts Ida* Hisunders tending is fraught *ith 
suspicion and fear of one another— 'this in sj*lte of an age of 
M p t i  transportation of good# end people end an almost instent 
c o m m i e s t l o n  of ideas* Access to the see lanes will reduce 
Russia’s * insular lsol& tion11 • In the Interest cf world peace the 
** island* and- the waters around it* Comnmniat Bussia and the- aon- 
comjnuniat world* rust understand eech other and rust understand 
the t their needs are? the same* All must have equal access to 
earkets and raw materials so that cordon aliss— the welfare and 
security of all peoples— say be reached«
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